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A New Global Capitalism? 
From "Americanism and Fordism" 
to "Americanization-Globalization" 
Robert J. Antonio and Alessandro Bonanno1 
"Americanism is swamping us." 
Luigi Pirandello (1929) 
Introduction 
This paper has two parts. First, we discuss the development of the discourse 
on Fordism and post-Fordism and its transition into a broader rubric about 
globalization. In the second part, we analyze dimensions of neoliberal 
globalization. Throughout the paper we elaborate and illustrate a socio-cultural 
approach to "economic" matters—regime analysis—that challenges the neoclas-
sical and neoliberal paradigms which dominate among American policy elites 
and which the United States exports globally through its political and economic 
power. Our main focus is on the American role in and hegemonic ideological 
vision of neoliberal globalization. 
Socio-Cultural Rupture and Regime 
Theories of Capitalism 
Fordism: Marxian-Gramscian Origins 
During the late 1970s, British and Continental thinkers revived the thought 
of early twentieth-century social theorist Antonio Gramsci. By the mid-1980s the 
revival was global, spread by new cultural studies approaches that employed his 
ideas and embraced him as a leading precursor. Stressing his concept of hege-
mony, cultural theorists shifted from postwar Marxist structuralism to revised or 
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post-Marxist perspectives, forged fresh critiques and politics, and stirred debate 
about the composition and very idea of the "left." About the same time, other 
thinkers, attempting to come to grips with substantial changes in economic 
conditions and public policy, revived Gramsci's concept of Fordism ([1929-
1935] 1971).2 Paralleling cultural theorists, they rejected economic determinism 
and acknowledged the importance of culture. But following Gramsci' s own break 
with "mechanical" Marxism, they continued to engage problems framed by Karl 
Marx and kept political economy and capitalism at the center of their work.3 
Generally Gramsci's concept of Fordism built on Marx's analysis of the 
transition from small-scale capitalism, which retained important premodern 
elements, to a complex, increasingly global capitalism that employs science/ 
technology as its leading productive force, mechanizes production, deskills 
workers, and generates big firms, big states, and big unions (i.e., Marx's shift 
from "manufacture" to "modern industry").4 Although prescient about major 
features of twentieth-century capitalism, including globalization, Marx focused 
primarily on the early phase of the Second Industrial Revolution, which occurred 
in England nearly forty years earlier than in the United States and economically 
advanced parts of Europe. Marx did not live long enough to witness the onset of 
the era of mass production and mass consumption described by Gramsci. 
By contrast, Gramsci theorized developments after World War I, when the 
new type of capitalism was being consolidated in the United States. He stressed 
the sweeping rationalization of production, the central role of finance capital, and 
the linkages between "petty bourgeois savers" (i.e., middle-class stockholders) 
and financial elites. However, his core concept of hegemony also emphasized the 
increasingly significant role of mass culture, mass media, mass consumption, and 
the enlarged state (e.g., expanded regulation, planning, and propaganda). His 
discussion of "Americanism and Fordism," a titled section of his Prison Note-
books, articulated his view that the capitalist economy is embedded in broader, 
historically specific socio-cultural regimes, each with distinct structures and 
processes, dominant and subordinate strata, hegemonic and counterhegemonic 
blocs, and patterns of struggle. 
The term Fordism signifies the importance that Gramsci attributed to the 
assembly-line production, managerial hierarchy, and technical control intro-
duced by automobile magnate Henry Ford. However, Gramsci's vision of the new 
capitalism featured distinct political and cultural, as well as "economic," dimen-
sions. He held that the Fordist labor process relied centrally on Taylorist 
rationalization, which simplified necessary operations, eliminated others, and 
radically routinized, deskilled, and intensified labor.5 Accordingly, managers and 
technicians did all the thought work and instituted comprehensive top-down 
control, which required operatives to work faster, more continuously, more 
mechanically, and in a more coordinated fashion. Gramsci claimed that Fordist 
elites were aware of the physically and psychologically demanding nature of the 
new labor process and that they recognized that conventional methods of labor 
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control, which relied on simple force, could not cope adequately with the new 
work regime's consequences—mounting worker dissatisfaction, high turnover, 
and workplace sabotage. Contending that the emergent strategy was to regulate 
workers by consent as well as by coercion, Gramsci held that Fordists improved 
wages and fringe benefits, provided more stable employment, and expanded the 
state's role in protecting worker well-being. At least indirectly, he anticipated the 
post-World War II era's capital-labor compromise and welfare state. Decrying 
the American "ideology" of equating higher wages with democratization, how-
ever, Gramsci argued that the new policies were manipulative responses to meet 
the demands of the Fordist labor process (1971, 310-13). 
Gramsci argued that Fordist business elites developed novel cultural mecha-
nisms to exert control in the wider society and to create the "standardized 
individuals" called for by Fordism's highly regimented forms of work and mass 
produced products. For example, he explained that Fordist owners and managers 
expressed increased interest in the moral and psychological condition of their 
workers. He contended that Henry Ford's surveillance of workers' family life, 
sexuality, and other activities outside the workplace exemplified efforts to 
nurture the voluntary submission of workers to the labor discipline required by 
this new order. Gramsci claimed that the Fordist cultural project was executed, 
as well, by public organizations and even voluntary associations (e.g., the Rotary 
Club, YMCA, and YWCA). In his view, American Puritanism, especially its 
emphases on monogamy, female subordination, and repressed sexuality provided 
a cultural basis for worker compliance. He believed that Prohibition and other 
resurgent remnants of Puritanism, which Ford supported, fostered a social 
psychological climate that harnessed workers to their jobs and contributed to the 
rise of the emergent Fordist regime of capital. But Gramsci held that the effort to 
revive this austere form of cultural discipline was aimed primarily at workers, 
while elites and middle classes were permitted and sometimes even encouraged 
to engage in wider alcohol use, increased sexual freedom, and experimentation 
with new types of culture and consumption (Gramsci 1971, 294-306). 
Gramsci viewed Fordism as more than a system of material production, 
insisting that it relied on cultural resources and forged new personality types. 
However, he held that the new capitalism was in an early phase and was mostly 
an unrealized ideal even in the United States ( 1971,286,317). He also argued that 
the Great Depression left everything open to question. Understanding that 
regional patterns of hegemony influenced capitalist development, Gramsci held 
that the remnants of Europe's parasitic, privileged, semi-feudal elites resisted 
Fordist "rationalization" and could block the full development of Fordism there. 
He thought that these traditionalist remains provided U.S. Fordism a significant 
advantage over European capitalism (1971, 305). He also argued that European 
elites might attempt to fuse elements of Fordism to divergent types of regimes 
(e.g., fascist corporatism). As illustrated by Gramsci's description of the "back-
ward" cultural characteristics and social organization of his native Italy and the 
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emergence of fascism and Nazism, it is clear that he saw Fordism as an important 
but contested possibility of global capitalism. Regardless of the contingencies, 
however, Gramsci thought that Fordist elites in the United States, by then the 
leading capitalist power, were creating a "planned economy" that was replacing 
earlier capitalism's "economic individualism." He believed that the need to 
balance mass production with mass consumption and avert economic crises 
required comprehensive bureaucratic planning and cultural coordination (Gramsci 
1971,279,306-16). 
The Post-World War 11 Era: "From High Fordism " to the "End of the American 
Century" 
We use "High Fordism" to signify the triumph of Fordist capitalism in post-
World War II era advanced capitalist societies.6 As Gramsci argued, the United 
States was the main innovator and leader of the early phase of the Fordist 
transition. Although Fordist development was interrupted by depression and war, 
the United States began the postwar era with its productive system intact and as 
the world's hegemonic military and economic superpower. The United States' 
geopolitical split with the communist bloc and with procommunist and unaligned 
postcolonial nations prevented a consolidated global capitalism under U.S. 
leadership and helped generate its "permanent war economy." U.S. "military 
Keynesianism" or "guided capitalism" lacked comprehensive income redistribu-
tion, social welfare programs, and planning of European social democracy, but 
it did substantially increase state expenditures, state regulation of the economy, 
and social welfare and public goods."7 
While most major capitalist societies were forced to rebuild after the war, 
U.S. manufacturing firms dominated their huge home market and much of the 
world market in the 1950s and 1960s. Despite major growth of the service sector, 
manufacturing still drove the U.S. postwar expansion. Explosive growth of 
federally subsidized suburbs (single-family homes and highway systems) and of 
the standard middle-class consumer package (e.g., autos and home appliances) 
forged a new mass consumer society. Employing breakthroughs in mainframe 
computer and other information processing technologies, managers of the pri-
mary sector's vertically integrated, corporate firms increasingly rationalized, 
centralized, and automated their operations. The dramatic expansion of higher 
education facilitated a new wave of managerial professionalization; increased the 
upper middle-class ranks of highly trained technical, financial, and legal special-
ists; and expanded basic research for the military and corporate sectors. Innova-
tions and growth of mass media and mass entertainment, especially TV, and 
expansion of the retail sector (e.g., shopping centers and chain stores) revolution-
ized marketing. The private sector's much enhanced methods of advertising and 
marketing and the state's Keynesian managing of aggregate demand (e.g., 
through state spending, monetary regulation, economic "fine-tuning") fostered 
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High Fordism's unparalleled ability to balance production and consumption and 
to maintain low unemployment, steady accumulation, and high rates of profit. 
During the postwar "capital-labor accord," union membership peaked, but 
unions generally cooperated with management. They traded aspirations for 
stakeholder rights in capital and shared control of the labor process for higher 
wages and benefits and stable employment. There was increased affluence, social 
security, and educational opportunity, especially for white males, and much 
upgraded standards of living for unionized blue-collar workers, the middle class, 
and above. Policy intellectuals and the press proclaimed the United States to be 
a new type of ultramodern, middle-class democracy that escaped classical 
capitalist crises and class conflicts and effectively ended debates over basic 
ideology (Hodgson 1978, 67-98). 
Many critics and advocates alike held that High Fordism worked so well for 
the enlarged and politically decisive middle class that alternatives were hard to 
imagine. However, sharp class, racial, and gender inequalities remained en-
trenched. Criticizing American intellectuals' acquiescence to injustice and regi-
mentation, radical sociologist and social critic C. Wright Mills warned that a 
"postmodern" world of "Cheerful Robots" was arising. Similarly, Herbert 
Marcuse, the leading theoretician of the 1960s "New Left," asserted that the 
United States was a "society without opposition." He held that its structure of 
"total administration" and technical coordination retained "stupefying" and 
"exhausting" types of work, but integrated the working-class into the system by 
effectively and widely delivering entertainment and consumer goods that "indoc-
trinate and manipulate" and destroy critical sensibilities and the desire for 
liberation. Contesting these views, the era's leading sociological theorist, Talcott 
Parsons, contended that the American "working-class" approximated "the leisure 
class," while "upper occupational groups" were among the hardest "'working' 
groups in human history." He argued that postwar America's unparalleled 
affluence and democratization were realizing the promise of liberty and equality 
and were earning the genuine support of the populace, rather than mere formal or 
ideological legitimacy. Portraying the United States as the "lead society'' 
Parsons held that "Americanization" would extend the advantages of progressive 
modernization's latest evolutionary breakthroughs to the rest of the world. He 
decried the New Left's "ideological pessimism" and premature claims about the 
rise of arepressive "postmodern society." In his view, progressive modernization 
had more than a century to go before it would lose impetus (Mills 1961,165-76; 
Marcuse 1964; Parsons 1971, 86-7, 112-14, 129, 140-3). 
By the late-1960s, race riots and campus disturbances, increased inflation, 
slower economic growth, and socio-political fragmentation had begun to erode 
High Fordist consensus. Numerous crises during the 1970s (racial tensions, oil 
shortages, recession, Watergate, the lost Vietnam War, the Iran-hostage crisis, 
increased taxation, and stagflation) increased socio-political fragmentation. 
Also, American manufacturers faced stiff challenges from European and Asian 
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competitors in the U.S. home market, profit squeezes, and diminished corporate 
profits. The rise of anti-Western movements (e.g., Islamic fundamentalism), 
worldwide challenges to Western modernization models, and new political 
alignments (e.g., OPEC) threatened U.S. dominance in international politics and 
economics. By the mid-1970s Western Europe also faced slower economic 
growth, increasing threats of terrorism, growing tensions over immigration, 
political fragmentation, and other problems. Critics declared that the High Fordist 
state was in a "legitimacy crisis" that derived from its inability to coordinate 
effectively or to deliver on its promises to provide social benefits, public goods, 
and regulation, on the one hand, and to insure economic growth, on the other 
(O'Connor 1973; Habermas 1975). 
In this climate, the U.S. corporate right mobilized politically and culturally 
against the social side of Keynesian liberalism; well-funded conservative foun-
dations and think-tanks initiated an effective ideological counteroffensive against 
regulation, income and wealth redistribution, and taxation ( Akard 1992). Ascendent 
"neoconservatives" revived free-market economics, and fused it with cultural 
conservatism. They charged that Lyndon Johnson's vision of a "Great Society" 
empowered a "New Class" of welfare state bureaucrats and policy intelligentsia, 
backed by an "adversary culture"of young radicals, who imposed egalitarian 
agendas that overreached realistic possibilities for reform, overloaded the state, 
rewarded free-riders, and undermined authority, civic morality, and labor disci-
pline.8 By the end of the decade, a number of politically diverse thinkers stressed 
an "end of consensus," "the decline of American morale," "the erosion of 
American power," or "the end of the American Century."9 
The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 marked the political ascendence of 
neoconservative forces, who blamed High Fordist strategies for American 
economic and socio-cultural decline and framed a project of "American renewal" 
that instituted "neoliberal" economic policies and, with less success, a right-wing 
cultural agenda.10 The U.S. left, with libertarian support, resisted the cultural 
changes, but mounted little opposition to the neoliberal economic tide. Even 
postwar liberalism's timid version of "equal opportunity" disappeared from the 
vocabulary of both political parties. Envisioned a little more than a decade before 
as the chief motor of postwar growth, High Fordist strategies were now seen as 
crippling "rigidities"—nefarious inefficiencies and the prime causes of Ameri-
can socio-economic decline. 
A widely read, controversial, and influential work of this period, Daniel 
Bell's Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism ([1976] 1996) held that capitalist 
work and productive organization were historically undergirded by Puritan 
morality and character structure and that this nonmarket culture constrained the 
desires unleashed by capitalist acquisition. In his view, however, bourgeois 
culture's workaday values and habits were being ravaged by the hedonistic 
popular culture that had emerged in the postwar era. Bell argued that the late-
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries' avant garde fashioned an "aesthetic" 
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modernism contradicting Protestant "asceticism." He contended that the recon-
structed "postmodern"version of avant garde aestheticism, revived by the 1960s 
counterculture revolt against bourgeois culture and then commercialized by the 
mass media and entertainment industry, universalized artistic alienation and 
shock, exhausted modernism's creative impulses, and neutralized values of work, 
saving, prudence, rationality, and responsibility.11 In this view, popular culture 
had evaporated the Puritan views of sexuality and work that Gramsci had argued 
were central in regulating the American working-class in the early days of 
Fordism. By contrast to the support that Gramsci claimed that American culture 
provided Fordist production, Bell asserted that a radical "disjunction of realms" 
had emerged ( 1996,3-171). His cultural critique resonated with neoconservative 
pleas to revive authority, religion, and Puritan austerity and work habits. 
Bell agreed with some neoconservative charges about postwar liberals' 
mismanagement of economic affairs and welfare. However, his views on these 
issues were more nuanced and politically ambiguous than usual neoconservative 
positions. Most important, Bell emphatically rejected neoliberal economism. He 
supported the welfare state and its central entitlements and stressed the need for 
a "fiscal sociology" and "public household." Bell argued that the Keynesian 
revolution and postwar affluence had transformed "economic growth" into a 
"secular religion" that holds politics hostage and produces severe "contradic-
tions" (e.g., resource and environmental problems, inflation, and class wars 
between the middle-class and working-class over taxation, the state budget, and 
entitlements) ( 1996,237-82). Bell contended that American liberalism possessed 
the resources to cope with the "national crisis," but that this required liberals to 
rethink their "public philosophy" and their conceptions of "social compact." 
Political ambiguities aside, Bell's broad purview and, especially, his argument 
that "economic issues are embedded [in] a larger 'cultural' question" [emphasis 
added] anticipated or even called for a revival of discourse about regimes of 
capitalism (Bell 1996, 242, 251-60, 278-82). 
Revived Dialogue over Regimes of Capitalism: Post-Fordism versus (post)-
Fordism 
New Fordism discourses arose during the late-1970s in response to these 
mounting signs of political and cultural crises and reorganization of postwar 
capitalism. Like Gramsci, the new approaches contended that the economy's 
cyclical growth and contraction phases were intimately interwoven with the rise, 
consolidation, and erosion of wider institutional and socio-cultural complexes or 
regimes of capitalism.n However, the revived Fordism discourses were, in part, 
shaped by earlier approaches to capitalism and by an intellectual climate on the 
left that favored regime analysis. Interest in these topics increased in the mid- and 
late-1960s and flourished, during the early- and mid-1970s, as refugees from the 
New Left attained academic prominence and crises in the postwar regime 
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mounted. The new approaches overlapped at key points with Gramsci's analyses 
of organizational rationalization and cultural justification, but they usually did 
not address his thought. For example, Harry Braverman's Labor and Monopoly 
Capital (1974), a widely read study of the maturation of postwar capitalism, 
explored more comprehensively and systematically than Gramsci the Taylorist 
mechanisms of control in large U.S. firms. Braverman was highly influential 
among left sociologists and even stimulated a great deal of mainstream research 
and conceptual debate. During the early-1970s, the broad studies of the British 
social historians, such as E.P.Thompson, E.J. Hobsbawn, and Christopher Hill, 
and of the French Annales school of social history, were widely read in the United 
States and Europe.13 
The dominant European approach in Marxist theory during the late-1960s 
and early-1970s—Louis Althusser's structuralism—employed conceptions of 
"social formation" and "ideology" that broke sharply with classical historical 
materialism and helped pave the way for the cultural turn in theory and the 
reappropriation of Gramsci's thought. During the same period, Marxian-rooted 
dependency theory and world-systems theory analyzed capitalism in broad 
historical perspective, stressing unequal relations between rich and poor coun-
tries in the global system.14 French Marxist Ernest Mandel's Late Capitalism 
([1972] 1978) was important because it revived N. D. Kondriatieff s early-
twentieth-century concept of 50-year "long waves" of alternating, roughly 25-
year boom and bust cycles. Mandel framed a regime vision of capitalism 
involving sequential long waves of technological advance, economic growth, and 
institutional and cultural innovation followed by socio-economic stagnation, 
crisis, and decline.15 He held that the early-1970s was the end of the fourth long 
wave's growth period and that erosion and crisis would follow. Predictions aside, 
Mandel's idea that capitalism's economic cycle is governed by long waves of 
social and institutional change was integrated into important discourses on 
Fordism. Moreover, Fredric Jameson (1984; 1991) brought Mandel's ideas into 
broader debates over cultural theory by crediting Late Capitalism as the source 
of his overall view of contemporary capitalism in his famous argument that 
postmodernism represented the regime's "cultural logic." 
A major split in the new discussions of Fordism was over the extent of the 
late-1970s and 1980s changes—whether features of the emerging phase of 
capitalism were "Fordist" or "post-Fordist."16 Also, thinkers disagreed over 
whether the changes initiated a better capitalism or merely a revised capitalism 
in decline. Fordism was not always mentioned explicitly in these discourses, but, 
like Gramsci, they conceptualized capitalism not simply as an economic system 
but also as a socio-cultural regime and studied the substantial technical, organi-
zational, socio-cultural, and political changes that lead to regime shifts. However, 
Gramsci's emergent Fordist regime, anticipating High Fordism, had stressed 
wider state intervention, increased planning, and higher social benefits. By 
contrast, the new discourses about Fordism arose in the wake of collapsing faith 
in public intervention and planning, falling social wages, and ascending eco-
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nomic individualism. Reactions to the changes ranged from those trumpeting a 
capitalist, democratic renaissance to others decrying a downward spiral into a 
deindustrialized, dedemocratized wasteland. By 1980, neoliberalism, which 
stressed free markets and free trade and sharp reductions in the state's regulatory 
and welfare roles, was hegemonic among U.S. policy elites and was also on the 
rise elsewhere. 
Optimistic arguments about a new progressive "post-Fordist" regime were 
animated, in part, by reports about the productive system and broader socio-
cultural arrangements in Italy's central and northeastern provinces. The Italian 
sociologist Arnaldo Bagnasco' s ( 1977) arguments about this region—the "Third 
Italy"—were further elaborated and thrust centrally into the wider debates over 
Fordism and post-Fordism by the American social scientists Michael J. Piore and 
Charles Sable ( 1984). They contrasted this region's decentralized and democratic 
yet highly effective capitalism both with the vertically integrated, bureaucratic, 
unionized, mass production of northwest Italy's great industrial cities and with 
the corrupt, underdeveloped, impoverished system in the south. They argued that 
innovations in new computer-driven machinery fit small-batch production and 
were affordable to small entrepreneurs. In the Third Italy, the new technologies 
were deployed in revived craft industries and new enterprises with reduced 
workplace hierarchies, highly skilled workforces, ample opportunities for work-
ers to become capitalists, and flexible labor processes that adjusted more rapidly 
to changes in consumer tastes and customized goods for niche markets. The Third 
Italy thesis held that this new industrial system averted the costs and inefficiencies 
of managerial and union bureaucracy and provided satisfying work and good pay 
and benefits. It also contended that these changes built on the region's pre-
existing culture of cooperation, trust, and social benefits, reflected in its socialist 
tradition, and propelled it from being one of Italy's poorer regions to its richest. 
Piore and Sabel' s widely discussed account of the Third Italy stressed the region's 
pattern of "flexible specialization," which broke with postwar Fordism's Taylorized 
mass production and standardized mass consumption. In their view, the new 
system had the potential to be applied on a much wider scale and forge a more 
democratic form of capitalism and modernity that balances individual and 
collective needs. Although they acknowledged that Fordism persisted, they 
argued that the historical moment in which they were writing constituted a 
"second industrial divide," paralleling the nineteenth-century "divide" between 
simple crafts manufacture and ascendent mass production. In their view, flexible 
specialization and its wider regime was the superior model and, thus, the likely 
successor to a crisis-ridden Fordism.17 
Other thinkers identified a parallel break with Fordism in the United States. 
Although speaking of a "postmodern" and "postmetropolitan" shift rather than of 
post-Fordismper se, Paul Leinberger and Bruce Tucker ( 1991 ) described an even 
more fundamentally restructured U.S. capitalism that was characterized by 
technically transformed workplaces, organizations, and neighborhoods; was 
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linked by knowledge-based "networks"; and that afforded able individuals nearly 
infinite opportunities for advancement or lateral movement. They portrayed a 
new generation of professionals forging a fresh "enterprise ethic" shaped to fit the 
post-postwar era. Leinberger and Tucker traced these post-Fordist tendencies to 
the "baby boomer" generational experience; in contrast to their parents' experi-
ence of the Depression, wartime unity, and postwar corporate culture, boomers 
grew up in affluence, opposed the Vietnam War, and distrusted big organizations. 
After flirtation with alternative life-styles, they entered highly competitive labor 
markets and restructured workplaces, which lacked the security their parents 
enjoyed. Leinberger and Tucker described a generation receptive to taking risks, 
to being creative, and to balancing the desire for professional success with values 
that favor increased cultural diversity, and, who, overall, reject the conformist 
worlds of their "organization men" fathers and stay-at-home moms. Aside from 
a few tepid remarks about people left out of the economic gains, they glowingly 
portrayed "decentered" organizations, "flattened" hierarchies, and empowered 
workers. Their fast-moving, wired, "centerless capitalism" and "urban villages" 
integrated firms, communities, and families as never before, providing more 
choices, delivering goods more effectively, and nurturing more autonomy and 
difference. In their view, the former "counterculture" became the cutting-edge of 
the "new economy." 
Most optimists conceded that huge Fordist firms were still important and 
subcontracted to the type of firms emphasized by Piore and Sable and Leinberger 
and Tucker. However, they held that debureaucratized, decentered post-Fordist 
firms were ascendant. We employ a parenthesized (post)-Fordism to signify 
approaches that pose more measured arguments about the erosion of Fordism and 
that reject claims that a radically reorganized, democratized capitalism was on the 
rise. Although acknowledging the significance of flexibly specialized craft firms 
and decentered aspects of larger firms, (post)-Fordists contended that such 
changes were integrated into overall regimes dominated by Fordist bureaucracies 
and their vertical hierarchies of authority, class, and status. Rather than fading 
away, they argued, Fordism's centralized, top-down bureaucracies still ruled core 
areas of capitalism and employed new computer and informational technologies 
to more effectively control, deskill, and regiment labor. In their view, recent 
technological and organizational innovations reflected a broader effort to over-
come the problems of postwar capitalism by means of a more intensive and 
extensive, yet more complexly differentiated, rationalization process. Stressing 
technical, organizational, and spatial restructuring, (post)-Fordists agreed that 
the postwar regime had been substantially altered. However, they held that the 
affluent middle-class oases, such as the Third Italy or Leinberger and Tucker's 
promised land of Irvine, California, and Silicon Valley were not the harbingers 
of an imminent Utopian order, but were instead integral components of an 
emergent and highly segmented global production system that linked knowledge-
based production in rich countries with harsh Third World manufacturing 
regimes, political repression, and poverty and with extensive employment of low-
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wage service workers (often immigrants or minorities) at home. (Post)-Fordists 
held that this reconfigured version of Fordism increased accumulation. However, 
they also saw in its "decentered" or "postmodernized" features new possibilities 
for resistance and democracy as well as for reproduction of the old types of 
drudgery and injustice. 
Starting in the late-1970s, the French "regulationist" school revived discus-
sion of Fordism to address multiple crises of postwar capitalism (e.g., Aglietta 
1979; Lipietz 1992; Jessop 1997). They contended that capitalism has cyclical 
periods of stability and crisis and that profit squeezes require a restructuring of the 
broader political and socio-cultural system as well as the economy. Breaking with 
the mechanistic Althusserian structuralism that dominated the continental left 
from the mid-1960s to mid-1970s, they took a more historicist approach to 
capitalist development that stressed agency. In their view, "regimes of accumu-
lation" and "modes of regulation" emerge, stabilize, stagnate, and fail, but regime 
shifts are always contested terrains, shaped by dynamics between hegemonic and 
counterhegemonic blocs. Regulationists described a breakdown and transforma-
tion of postwar Fordism during the late-1970s and 1980s, but they held that the 
shift preserved major facets of Fordism (Sites 2000,138). Aglietta (1979; 1982) 
argued that mass consumption was a vital new ingredient of the mature version 
of U.S. Fordism that flourished from 1945 to 1966. He argued that 1930s labor 
struggles were the decisive factor that later led to increased wages and benefits 
in the postwar regime. Aglietta believed that Fordism began to stagnate in the late 
1960s when new cybernetic and information technologies were used to restruc-
ture work processes and firms, increasing centralization and control, raising rates 
of exploitation, and employing liberal ideology and extended state power to 
legitimate and enforce the changes.18 
In the United States, the question of regime became acute during the crisis-
plagued late 1970s and recessionary early 1980s. Outmoded manufacturing 
equipment, shoddy products, plant shutdowns, increased unemployment, social 
decline in the "rust belt," capital flight to the "sun belt" and other countries, 
weakened labor unions, more polarized labor markets, reduced wages and 
benefits, and apparent shrinkage of the middle-class—all were interpreted as 
symptoms of the breakdown of High Fordism.19 Paralleling French regulationists, 
American "structures of accumulation" theorists emphasized broader political 
and socio-cultural regimes and focused especially on the role of class alliances 
and struggles. These theorists held that U.S. capitalism's cyclical expansions and 
recessions manifested four "long swings," agreeing with Mandel's earlier view 
that the fourth and most recent one (starting about 1950) had entered a stagnation 
phase (Gordon, Edwards, and Reich 1982). By the mid-1980s, certain thinkers in 
this group stressed that struggles for liberal rights and citizenship by women and 
minorities as well as labor struggles of predominantly white male workers had 
eroded Fordism and provided resources for creation of a more democratic, 
postliberal alternative (Bowles and Gintis 1986). 
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A most influential (post)-Fordist work, David Harvey's Condition of 
Postmodernity ( 1989), similarly portrayed a new system of restructured firms and 
labor markets, weakened labor unions and working-class political parties, and 
diminished welfare rights. This English geographer's views about the recent 
structural changes complemented those of the regulationists and structures of 
accumulation theorists, and, like Mandel, Harvey stressed long-wave shifts of 
international capitalism. But he emphasized especially the spatial reconfiguration 
of capitalism on a global basis. Although speaking of "postmodernity," he held 
that these structural changes are simply the most recent phase of a technologically 
based long-term process of "time-space compression" that makes the world's 
farthest reaches increasingly accessible to each other. Under capitalism, he 
argued, time-space compression is accelerated in great bursts following major 
profit squeezes and market crises, during which capitalists seek technical inno-
vations (e.g., steamships and railway trains, radio and electric power, TVs and 
computers) that could accelerate capital's "turnover time" and speed realization 
of profit and reinvestment. 
Harvey stressed the importance of capital mobility, but he addressed its 
significance in the context of a comprehensive vision of broader socio-cultural 
change. He connected "flexible accumulation" with cultural postmodernization, 
attending closely to matters of representation (e.g., postmodern architecture, 
film, theory). Harvey treated postwar Fordism as a "total way of life" and the new 
ensemble of social changes as a much more segmented, simulated, global, 
postmodern version of the same capitalist system or (post)-Fordism (1989,135). 
According to Harvey, the global markets, which favor rootless finance capital, are 
linked by new instant modes of communication, media, information and trans-
port. In his view, these technical changes generated a crisis of representation 
manifested in highly differentiated, hybridized, restless, schizophrenic, postmodern 
culture. Harvey was ambiguous about the prospects for post-Fordist or post-
liberal democracy, and he implied that postmodernization exhausts left politics. 
Although other thinkers have systematically explored the connections between 
postmodernism and capitalism (e.g., Bell [1976] 1996; Jameson 1984; 1991]), 
Harvey provided a comprehensive vision of a capitalist regime shift that con-
nected deftly new technologies, capital mobility, spatially reconfigured social 
relations, restructured organizations, and cultural transformation on a global 
scale. His work helped set the stage for the current discussion of globalization. 
After the Postwar Era: 
Periodizing Capitalism in the Age of Globalization 
The New World Order: From the" End of History'' to "The Washington 
Consensus " 
By the mid-1990s, broader theoretical debates over neoliberal restructuring 
were carried out largely under the rubric of "globalization." Most of the core 
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issues from the earlier discourses over Fordism remained, but actual use of the 
terms "Fordism" and "post-Fordism" diminished. Globalization is not a new 
issue. Although the unique facets and intensity of globalization's impact today 
are hard to deny, the process has been entwined with capitalist development from 
its inception (e.g., Held et al. 1999). Marx made this point emphatically in his 
youthful comments on capitalism, and he developed the theme in his mature 
work. Similarly, postwar-era Marxians stressed High Fordism's growing interna-
tional scope (Mandel 1978,310-76). However, by the early 1980s, recession and 
deindustrialization brought international competition to the center of U.S. public 
policy debates. Later in the decade, Bennett Harrison and Barry Bluestone's 
influential Great U-Turn (1988) identified globalization as a core (post)-Fordist 
strategy that enhanced "flexibility" through "capital mobility," helping capital 
weaken labor unions, escape regulation, reduce social wages, and restore accu-
mulation by cutting costs. 
The 1989 collapse of Eastern European communism ended the Cold War, 
and the U.S.-led 1991 multinational intervention in Iraq began the post-postwar 
era. President George H. Bush's oft-quoted reference to the "new world order" 
aptly expressed the new geopolitical realities that opened vast new areas of the 
world to capitalist investment, labor regimes, and products. A truly globally 
integrated capitalism was now possible. These events generated much wider 
discussion of globalization. Harking back to post-Allende Chile's "economic 
miracle," orchestrated by Milton Friedman's "Chicago boys," U.S. policymakers 
and economists prescribed neoliberal "shock therapy" to insure rapid 
postcommunist transitions to capitalism and insisted on austerity programs in 
Third World countries seeking World Bank or IMF loans. Armed with ostensibly 
"universal" knowledge about human nature and "the laws of the market" and 
ready-made data from mathematical models, U.S. economic experts disregarded 
the significance of local culture and institutions, confident that their policy 
recommendations would work in any aspiring capitalist region.20 They did not, 
however, conceptualize the "economy" in the manner of the thinkers previously 
discussed in this paper—as a regime of social structures and processes embedded 
in and dependent upon a broader historical, socio-cultural complex. After the 
Cold War ended, economic inequalities increased, the "North-South" divide 
grew sharper as many of the poorest nations suffered economic and socio-
political disintegration, and "retribalization"—a wave of populist uprisings, 
struggles for autonomy, and racial, ethnic, religious conflicts—intensified and 
sometimes reached genocidal proportions. Buoyed by the Reagan renaissance's 
military build-up, economic restructuring, and stress on America's special 
mission in the "free world," the United States regained its confidence and eagerly 
embraced its role of the hegemonic power in a more complicated and dangerous 
world. 
Written at the very moment that the Soviet bloc was disintegrating, Francis 
Fukuyama's (1989; 1992) "end of history" thesis proclaimed a new age of 
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unchallenged global neoliberalism. Widely discussed in the popular media and 
debated by social theorists, his essay became aprime textual marker of the victory 
of the U.S.-led "West" and end of the postwar era. Fukuyama believed that, in the 
wake of collapsed communism and failed postwar liberalism (both of which 
reflected misguided economic egalitarianism and social-engineering), "liberal 
democracy" (i.e., free-market capitalism ) was the only option for any nation 
aspiring to be modern. He speculated that we may now be "at a point where we 
cannot imagine a world substantially different from our own, in which there is no 
apparent or obvious way in which the future will represent a fundamental 
improvement over our current order..." ( 1992,51). Fukuyama revived triumphal 
postwar ideas of progressive modernization and the end of ideology, but his 
minimalist view of democracy (i.e., free markets, formal equality, legal rights) 
scuttled the Parsonsian emphases on social justice and the welfare state. Although 
Fukuyama embraced neoliberalism, he still feared a possible weakening of the 
legitimacy of liberal democracy and stopped short of an unrestrained celebration 
of its triumph.21 Fukuyama was roundly attacked by left-leaning critics for his 
fervent neoconservatism, but they often grudgingly accepted his assertions about 
neoliberal hegemony and the lack of political alternatives (e.g., Bauman 1992, 
175-204; Offe 1996, 3-30).22 
However, during the mid- and late-1990s, the U.S. stock-market boom 
generated a "new optimism" and more celebratory views of the new global 
capitalism appeared in a genre of books aimed at high-tech and dot-com 
entrepreneurs, investors, managers, symbolic analysts, and other successful 
professionals. Often draped in postmodern attire, this type of post-Fordism is 
reminiscent of 1960s claims about a "post-industrial society," "end of ideology," 
and post-Marxian and post-Weberian capitalism free of the rigid bureaucracies 
and class contradictions of earlier capitalist regimes and so drastically altered that 
an entirely new socio-economic world appears on horizon. In part, the new 
optimism emanates from the belief that communication and information tech-
nologies, which connect global markets, overcome the divides of space and 
culture. TV commercials for computer and internet products often have a 
multinational theme. But they also express optimism about matters closer to 
home. A popular TV commercial and poignant expression of these sensibilities 
features a young "punk" employee instructing his buttoned-down, past middle-
age boss how to buy stock on-line and winning him over. The "new economy" 
bridges the cultural gap between the now exuberant (i.e., after the successful 
trade) boss and hip young friend. Correspondents for the venerable free market-
oriented Economist, John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge (2000, 341-2) 
argue that neoliberal globalization is creating the best of all possible worlds—a 
wired economy that approximates neoclassical theory's perfect markets, where 
"rational individuals pursue their interests in light of perfect information, rela-
tively free from government interference and geographical obstacles" and a 
political world that approaches liberal theory ' s perfect freedom, where individu-
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als have the ethical autonomy to choose "the good life wherever they find it." The 
authors' glowing faith in neoliberalism, which has a religious quality, is mani-
fested in their book's title: A Future Perfect. 
Thomas L. Friedman's best selling Lexus and the Olive Tree (2000) is, 
perhaps, the most comprehensive (albeit not the most extreme) expression of the 
optimistic view of globalization.23 The mainstream media have celebrated this 
work as the guidebook to globalization and its author as the process' leading 
pundit. This book is the exemplar what of has been termed the "Washington 
consensus"—the idea that the U.S. neoliberal or laissez-faire model should guide 
globalization. Friedman argues that the United States is perfectly situated for 
global competition and for its role as globalization's "ultimate benign hegemon 
and reluctant enforcer." Referring to "Americanization-globalization," Friedman 
unabashedly resurrects the postwar idea of the United States as the world's lead 
society (2000,367,383). He admits that globalization can be disruptive and elicit 
an occasional dangerous "backlash," but is less cautious than Fukuyama in his 
embrace of neoliberalism. However, the Lexus and the Olive Tree's back cover 
still bears Fukuyama's imprimatur, declaring that it captures "the real character 
of the new world order." 
Friedman contends that an "integrated,""cosmopolitan" "globalization sys-
tem," composed of global free markets, new technologies and organizations, and 
rational investors, has replaced the "divided," "frozen," "Cold War System." The 
new order, he claims, represents a global revolution—a democratization of 
technology, finance, and information that has created a "fast world," or 
nonhierarchical, open, dynamic "web" with the "internet as its backbone" (2000, 
8-9, 44-72, 200). Exalting the virtues of neoliberal globalization and believing 
that modernization is driven by global free markets and investor choices, 
Friedman claims that the "Electronic Herd" of e-trading individual investors and 
multinational companies grow the economy so effectively that all nations 
aspiring to be modern must converge toward the American model. Refusal to don 
the "Golden Straightjacket" (i.e., globalization) condemns a nation to marginality 
(2000, 104-11). Friedman organizes entire chapters around profound images of 
globalization, such as "the golden arches theory of conflict prevention" (countries 
with McDonald's do not go to war with each other), the "Michael Jordan of 
geopolitics" (the United States—globalization's brilliant architect), "microchip 
immune deficiency" (the disease of resisting globalization), and the"five gas 
stations theory of the world" (U.S. neoliberalism vs. inferior regimes).24 Friedman's 
argument rests on two critical assumptions; first, free markets work efficiently, 
enrich the majority, and open the way for myriad rational choices that advance 
economic growth and globalization; second, global free markets need U.S. 
military power to stem brushfire wars and terrorism and to insure property rights 
and social stability. Distancing himself from the right, however, he supports the 
nation's social safety-net, its multicultural character, and international role (in the 
UN, NATO, WTO, IMF). Friedman's self-described "rational exuberance" about 
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the stock-market boom, enriched professional middle-class, and revised 
neoliberalism (giving lip service to social issues) manifests a shift in the dominant 
ideology of U.S.-led neoliberal globalization from 1980s neoconservatism to the 
centrist politics of Clinton and Blair (2000, 367-88, 438-9, 463-7, 475). 
Prior to Friedman, Benjamin R. Barber in Jihad vs McWorld ( 1996), held that 
globalization has a U.S. "template" (or "speaks American"), is driven by free 
market deregulation and innovation in information-communication technolo-
gies, and generates populist backlashes. Both authors employ metaphoric titles, 
alluding to inherent tensions between global commercial culture and local 
traditions. Barber also embraces cosmopolitan modernity, but in a much more 
qualified way than Friedman.25 Barber criticizes the current pattern of globalization, 
especially the leading U.S.-dominated "new information sector." Referring to 
Michael Jordan and "The Nike Image" to illustrate global trade in virtual realities, 
Barber holds that U.S. pop culture and life-style are inscribed in and sell the 
product. The image overtakes the product in this postmodern style of peddling 
goods. Barber contends that massive media concentration through takeovers, tie-
ins, and licensing empower American purveyors of video goods and images; they 
flood global markets, undermine local media industries, and spread U.S. con-
sumer culture to nations that cannot sustain it without destructive cultural and 
environmental consequences (1996, 58-72, 78-9, 293-300). However, Barber 
argues that McWorld is not monolithic, but is received differently throughout the 
world, producing local fusions, hybrid elements and resistance from local 
cultures. He does not oppose global markets and consumption per se, admitting 
that they have virtues and favoring them over the closed, insular traditional forces 
that arise in reaction. But he is highly critical of U.S. neoliberalism's equation of 
free trade, free markets, and consumer-investor choice with democracy. 
Recall that Friedman applauds the diminution of political regulation, iden-
tifying consumer- investors as the motor force of globalization and equating them 
with the demos. Acknowledging increased socio-economic inequality both 
within and between nations, he must be aware that the majority of the world's 
people lack the resources to participate widely in consumption and, especially, in 
investment. Friedman views neoliberal globalization as a democratization pro-
cess, but he is undaunted that poor people and people of modest means have no 
voice in the process. Globalization critics argue that the neoliberal celebration of 
the market and rollback of the political sphere limits genuine citizenship to the 
middle-class and above and reduces democracy to a "stockholders republic." 
Neoliberalism liberates markets and their participants from regulation by repre-
sentatives of the overall citizenry and by the institutional and socio-cultural 
worlds in which they are embedded. Although recognizing that nurturance of 
responsible citizenship and effective political mediation is no easy matter, critics, 
such as Barber, contend that genuine democratization requires much wider 
participation than consumers and investors and much broader purview than the 
individual self-interest that rules in market choices. Overall, critics contend that 
market-driven globalization has two basic problems: the erosion of democracy 
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within nation-states and the absence of an international civil society and political 
sphere to mediate transnational finance, commerce, and organizations. Accord-
ing to the critics, if Fukuyama is correct that political options are restricted to 
either neoliberal globalization or fundamentalist ethnic or religious republics that 
spring up in backlash, then we are condemned to a "terminally postdemocratic" 
future (Barber 1996, 20). 
By the late-1990s, thinkers across the political spectrum concurred that 
neoliberal policy is a globally hegemonic American idea, but they disagreed over 
its origins and how it is perpetuated. Advocates of the so-called "Washington 
consensus," such as Friedman, usually see it as a natural product of diffuse, 
individual, rational choices, while critics argue that it is forged by U.S. economic 
and military power, achieved not as a result of conspiracy or direct force, but 
rather as a consequence of the United States' "enormous structural power," which 
is "deeply inscribed into the nature and functioning of the present world order" 
(Held et al., 1999, 425). In his incisively critical False Dawn, Englishman and 
former libertarian John Gray declares that neoliberal globalization is an "Ameri-
can project" fashioned with a great deal of help from the U.S. state. "Free markets 
are creatures of state power," he contends, "and persist only so long as the state 
is able to prevent human needs for security and the control of economic risk from 
finding political expression" (1998,17,100). Scathingly rejecting claims about 
universal "truths" of the market, Gray argues that neoliberalism reflects an 
Enlightenment rationalism and universalism retrofitted to distinctly American 
conditions and then exported worldwide, without regard for local cultures or 
contexts and blind to the diversity of capitalisms. He holds that the practical 
failures of orthodox Marxism arise from similar universalizing Enlightenment 
ways (i.e., one economic model works in every setting). However, he contends 
that neoliberal globalization generates such uneven development, glaring in-
equalities, and intense political instability that it undermines the very socio-
cultural foundations of its markets. Seeing the "new world order" as an American 
hallucination, Gray attacks the Washington consensus' assumption "that the 
Hobbesian problem of maintaining order has been solved"—i.e., that societies 
require only minimal political governance. Gray contends that this position is a 
fatal error in a world where, outside the richest countries, the vast majority of 
people live on the margins and suffer intense socio-economic privation and 
insecurity and where rampant nationalism and religious-ethnic conflict prevail. 
In his view, neoliberalism and the new communication and information technolo-
gies free markets from socio-political regulation, institutionally disembedding 
the economy, enriching elites and professional middle-classes, and undercutting 
the prospect of freedom and well-being for the vast majority of people. He asserts 
that genuine "democracy and the free market are competitors rather than part-
ners" (1998, 7, 201-2, 205, 208, 213). 
Advocates of the Washington consensus hold that globalization is the work 
of almost divine universal rationality. Friedman says that if a "visionary 
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geoarchitect" was asked a century ago to design the model society for a globalized 
world, he or she could have hardly done better than the current U.S. system (2000, 
368). Yet his effusion about the wonders of neoliberalism pales beside the 
revolutionary rapture found in the manifestos of several dot-com entrepreneurs 
(e.g., Schwartz et al., 1999). By contrast, Gray charges that attribution of a 
magical rationality to global markets is a fiction that lends neoliberal globalization 
an air of inevitability and averts thought about options or contestation (Friedman's 
"Golden Straightjacket"). Preliminary results of an ongoing ten-nation study 
indicate that chief executives of U.S. transnational firms (TNCs and nongovern-
mental organizations (NGOs) share a "market idiom" that equates neoliberal 
deregulation with "human progress and enlightenment" and resistance to the 
process as brazen irrationality.26 The researchers state that "the most striking 
feature of globalization's vanguard is the sense of moral innocence that they 
[CEOs] maintain about the world they are helping create." They report that the 
executives claim to be totally objective and neutral about their views of 
globalization, and seem oblivious that their American background might obscure 
their vision. It is not at all surprising, therefore, that the executives seldom speak 
any language other than English, "inhabit a socio-cultural bubble" (e.g., U.S.-
style hotels, health clubs, restaurants) when they visit other nations, and associate 
almost exclusively with like-minded, western-educated professionals. Gray 
asserts sarcastically that the neoliberal creed "implies that all humans are born 
American, and become anything else by accident—error [and that] American 
values are, or will soon be shared by all humankind." He stresses that this fervent 
ethnocentrism and neoliberal faith foreclose discussion of today's most pressing 
policy question: "how to reconcile the imperatives of deregulated markets with 
enduring human needs" (1998, 132). 
At the turn of the twentieth century, Max Weber declared that the "spirit of 
capitalism" had been severed completely from its original religious roots. In his 
view, capitalists' insatiable drive for acquisition had become "pure utilitarian-
ism," and, in the United States, the locus of this ethic's "highest development," 
it had come to be identified with "purely mundane passions" or "sport." He held 
that the direction of capitalism was now inexorably determined by its "mechani-
cal foundations" ([1904-5] 1958,181-3). Today few thinkers deny that structural 
mechanisms of capital and power play an enormous role in globalization. As the 
discussion above implies, however, many thinkers also hold that cultural beliefs 
with American roots greatly facilitate the process. We are hardly at the end of 
ideology. Globalization advocates re-enchant the spirit of capitalism, treating 
neoliberal globalization as a messianic mission and making it the religion of 
business and state.27 As theologian Harvey Cox (1999) argues, they ascribe to the 
"The Market" powers of omniscience, omnipotence, and omnipresence and, 
ultimately, treat it as if it were "God." This religious fervor pervades Friedman's 
book right up to his closing meditation about the compatibility of religion and 
electronically-mediated global capitalism (i.e., "fast capitalism") and the ques-
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tion of—"Is God in cyberspace?" (2000, 468-70). Similarly Micklethwait and 
Wooldridge end their work with a panegyric about the imminent rise of neoliberal 
Utopia. Employing quasireligious imagery ("The Individual's Prayer"and "An 
Empire without End"), they praise global capitalism for making liberal individu-
alism the top priority and creating near perfect markets. Quoting Sir Robert Peel's 
points about individual freedom fulfilling "the beneficent designs of an all-seeing 
Creator" and "Christian Duty," the authors suggest that the IMF ought to find 
more spiritual and streetwise ways of spreading the word about the benefits of 
globalization (2000, 332-43). 
Numerous internet gurus attach a New Age religiosity to fast capitalism. The 
Cluetrain Manifesto (Levine et al. 2000, 39, 82-3, 90-1,102) claims that "net-
worked markets" are "conversations" and replace High Fordism's manipulative 
management and marketing strategies with a discursively democratic new 
economy of "human voices" that speak a truth-telling "word of web" language. 
Implying that web-based markets are sacred, they hold that "This fervid desire for 
the web bespeaks a longing [for a "return to voice"] so intense that it can only be 
understood as spiritual." Believers in this re-enchanted spirit of capitalism often 
embrace culturally progressive causes, sing praises to change, flattened hierar-
chy, open discourse, broader participation, multicultural workplaces, and saving 
the planet from ecological disaster (Schwartz et al. 1999). But this perspective 
consecrates technocratic infrastructure and reduces the social world to rational 
actors, preferences, and choices.28 Called by some the "Californian ideology," 
this libertarianism with a muted social conscience rules among the new economy ' s 
information and communication technology elites.29 These globalization advo-
cates assume that the stock market investments that have enriched themselves 
assure rational allocation of resources and revolutionary socio-economic progress 
on a global scale. Critics charge that this theology lacks theoretical and empirical 
support—that the soaring stock market gains explain sky-high CEO compensa-
tion packages and the hefty accumulations of some middle class investors, but 
provide little insight into actual global corporate governance or overall socio-
economic development (O'Sullivan 2000). Carriers of the new spirit of capital-
ism do not treat the economy and democracy as social things, and see global 
capitalism's blemishes to be largely technical or individual imperfections. They 
claim to be fomenting a revolution that will free the engine of progress from its 
postwar manacles; the liberated holy trinity of the all-powerful, all-knowing 
market, magical web, and hyper-rational investor-consumer will enrich us all or, 
at least, greatly improve the lot of humanity. This new civil religion or ideology, 
which re-enchants the economy—the most worldly, rationalized domain of 
modernity—produces a stunningly good conscience and is the fabric of the 
blinders described by Gray and other globalization critics. It surely has pervaded 
the 1990s climate summarized by Perry Anderson (2000, 10): "What is the 
principal aspect of the past decade? Put briefly, it can be defined as the virtually 
uncontested consolidation, and universal diffusion of neo-liberalism."30 
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The Interregnum After High Fordism: Mapping Neoliberal Globalization 
We concur with (post)-Fordist arguments that neoliberal globalization 
represents a significant break with postwar capitalism, but it retains too many 
High Fordist elements to represent a complete rupture. The new regime is not yet 
on the horizon. In the discussion to follow, we outline schematically a multidi-
mensional and contested process of neoliberal globalization. The emphasis on 
"neoliberal" is to remind readers that we focus on a part of a broader process. We 
explore a regime of capitalism in motion not globalization as a whole. In other 
words we are not trying to reduce globalization to an "economic" complex. We 
believe that capitalism has enormous-indeed fateful-consequences for life on a 
planet that has never before been so commodified, but we want to avoid sterile 
debates about the relative importance of different factors (e.g., economic versus 
cultural) in a broader, complexly intertwined, and indeterminate globalization 
process. 
Flexible Accumulation: 
Commodification/Recommodification 
Neoliberals' self-declared aim is maximal "flexibility" and minimal "rigid-
ity." Put simply, flexibility refers to the pursuit of profis with as few restrictions 
as possible under the most favorable conditions and in the widest possible arena. 
The consequent diminution of social, political, and geographical constraints on 
capital accumulation and the vastly expanded scope of market exchange have 
been the engine of globalization. Even some cultural theorists who criticize 
economism of both the right and the left concede that globalization has intensified 
and extended commodification (e.g., Tomlinson 1999, 81-8). Deregulation, 
privatization, reduced public subsidies, and increased user fees, argued under a 
rubric of small government, tax cuts, and local control, have been the core of the 
U.S. neoliberal agenda. These strategies have often operated in concert with a 
racial politics, urging, sotto voce, for reduced support for "undeserving," "free-
riding" minorities. Regardless of the level of actual participation in international 
markets, managers argue that international competition and their very survival 
compels them to intensify and extend work-time; use sliding shifts or beepers; 
minimize wages and benefits; employ part-time, temporary, or contract labor; 
and fight union and government "interference." Re-engineered organizational 
structure, new communication and information technology, and restructured 
financial operations serve the similar ends. Enhanced "efficiency" translates into 
increased return on invested capital. 
On a global scale, neoliberals pit free trade, private initiative, market-led 
growth, and outward-oriented development against postwar demand stimulation, 
import-substitution, state intervention, and central planning. Their policies 
increase capital mobility and diminish its social burdens (e.g., Harrison and 
Bluestone 1988; Rifkin 1996; 2000; Brohman 1996; Brenner 1998; Gray 1998, 
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1-54) Globalization has also accelerated the global shift from independent 
production and in-kind exchange to wage labor and provision of needs through 
market exchange. The numbers of wage workers have doubled during the past 
three decades of globalization (Coates 2000: 256). An important part of this 
growth—commodification of peasant life creates a labor force for Third World 
industrialization and consumers for the home market. The process also facilitates 
a new international division of labor that accelerates a shift in rich nations from 
manufacturing to information and service production. Further, it provides a 
flexible pool of immigrant labor often employed in the First World as domestics 
for the "busy" professional middle-class and as disposable, low-cost casual 
workers in very low pay, hazardous jobs. This ongoing proletarianization process 
is reminiscent of early capitalism rather than of a postindustrial economy (Sassen 
1998). Commodification is also advanced by other strategies, such as creation of 
new markets (e.g., web advertising and dot.com business), deregulation (e.g., 
opening areas formally closed to advertising to commercial messages), and 
recommodification of public goods (e.g., raising tuition at public colleges). 
Laissez-faire policy disembeds markets from socio-cultural and political institu-
tions, reducing capital's costs, increasing its mobility, and advancing its power 
vis-à-vis labor and the state. As Gray says, the neoliberal dream "of a single global 
market assumes that economic life of every nation can be refashioned in the image 
of the American free market" (1998, 4). 
The Digital Revolution: 
Re-Engineering and Network Organizations 
Most globalization writers stress the vital role of new technologies, which 
accelerate, diversify, improve, and cut the costs of communication and informa-
tion (e.g., Giddens 2000,24-37; Tomlinson 1999,1-31). Friedman, for example, 
asserts that: "Globalization has its own defining technologies: computerization, 
miniaturization, digitalization, satellite communications, fiber optics, and the 
Internet..." (2000,9). Globalization advocates and critics alike hold that the new 
technologies give rise to network organizations, which are communicatively-
based, process-oriented, dispersed, horizontal, ad hoc, complex, and dynamic. 
The web is the prototypical network. Network organizations invert the rigid, top-
down bureaucratic command structures described by Weber and advocated by 
Taylor and Ford. Many commentators portray the new communication and 
information technologies as producing a great leap forward in a "Third Industrial 
Revolution" that began with postwar mainframe computers. Besides improving 
communication, they hold, the new technologies are "thinking machines," and 
are able to perform "conceptual, managerial, and administrative functions and [to 
coordinate] production, from extraction of raw materials to marketing and 
distribution of final goods and services" (Rifkin 1996,60; Castells 1996,29-65). 
However, thinkers sharply disagree about the new technologies' impacts. 
Celebrants claim that the technologies forge a democratic revolution, while 
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critics contend that they polarize already sharp inequalities. The new technolo-
gies (e.g., money-machines, cell phones, Amazon.com, bulletin boards) have 
improved substantially the lives of many people, saving time, energy, and money, 
creating fresh opportunities, opening access, providing convenience and cultural 
enrichment, and democratizing certain activities and spaces. For example, they 
are indispensable even to organizations that resist neoliberal globalization (e.g., 
anti-WTO protesters in Seattle made wide use of the web to publicize, mobilize 
support for, and organize their cause). Still the democratic revolution trumpeted 
by Friedman and other globalization advocates gives only lip service to the 
"digital divide" or "cyber-segmentation." Celebrating the creation of vast new 
democratic spaces, open to everyone, they simply fail to acknowledge that these 
domains are private or accessible primarily to people who can afford the 
equipment costs or user fees, especially high cost electronic services. Although 
efforts are being made to provide free computer access in public spaces such as 
schools and libraries, it is still significant that, in the year 2000, 73 percent of 
American children live in households without Internet access and 49 percent lack 
a computer. For the most part, poor people live a nonwired existence; 84 percent 
of the households in low income urban areas have no computer and 20 percent 
have no phone. The gap is far greater in poor countries, where the vast majority 
lack access to the basic technologies of the "new economy." 
Regardless of their positive features and untapped potential, the new tech-
nologies have been deployed in the United States and certain other countries 
precisely at the moment when neoliberal policies have reduced public invest-
ment, increased privatization, and blocked strategies to provide both wider public 
access to spaces "gated"31 by money and to reduce socio-economic inequalities. 
Even technological investments in U.S. public schools, which vary widely with 
communities' taxable wealth, manifest the divide between rich and poor districts. 
Globalization advocates declare the dawn of a new informational democracy, but 
they appear oblivious that the new technologies empower some strata and 
nations, but fail to provide full "citizenship" in the new cyberspaces to those who 
lack adequate financial resources (Rifkin 1996, 165-217; 2000; Sassen 1998, 
178-80; Bradley 2000). 
Similar points hold for network organizations. Globalization advocates 
speak of a "shift from hierarchies to networks"; employees of "all types" are seen 
to be "active subjects" participating freely in "active communication"on the 
debureaucratized web (Leinberger and Tucker 1991, 332-51). Undergirding the 
meteoric rise of the NASDAQ and so-called "new economy," the new technolo-
gies have been used to restructure and re-engineer organizations. These technolo-
gies have had many laudable effects and are used in horizontal networks such as 
internet bulletin boards. However, most high wage information and financial 
workers, who personify the net revolution, operate in much more hospitable 
workplaces and organizational environments than the far more numerous non-
professionals, especially low wage service workers. The differences are even 
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more pronounced for immigrant casual workers or for workers in the often 
authoritarian and nineteenth century-like labor processes of Third World U.S. 
affiliates (e.g., Greider 1998). As we have previously noted, core facets of Fordist 
organizational structure persist in most parts of large U.S. firms; the new 
technologies are employed largely to implement "downsizing," "lean produc-
tion," "just in-time production," "outsourcing," and other types of neoliberal 
rationalization in order to improve control, regimentation, and surveillance and, 
thus, to decrease costs and increase return on invested capital (Rifkin 1996, 90-
106; 2000; Castells 1996, 151-259; Dyer-Witheford 1999; Prechel 1994; 1997; 
2000, 175-279: Prechel and Boisl998; Staples 2000). 
Deterritorialization/Postmodernization: 
U.S.-Accented Cultural Hybridity 
The current phase of globalization has been characterized by dramatically 
increased transnational movement of material goods, images, and people (Sassen 
1998; 2000). This increased mobility leads to new mixtures of culture or 
hybridization. Local cultures have long been affected—even shaped—by outside 
forces, and, historically, under capitalism, they have been torn from their local 
moorings (Harvey 1988,199-352; Giddens 1990,21-9).32Thus,deterritorialization 
is not a new process. But neoliberal globalization's transnational division of labor 
and free trade stir multisided fusions, blurred borders, and cultural homelessness. 
Its worldwide infrastructure of airports, malls, computer terminals, chain restau-
rants, and other "nonplaces" erase distinct space and history, and its core means 
of communication, such as the web, is even more radically deterritorialized 
(Tomlinson 1999, 108-20). 
As Seago shows clearly in his article in this issue, cultural goods with 
indefinite origins abound; what appears to be traditional is invented; and what 
seems to be homogenous is hybrid. "American made" products often incorporate 
design and engineering ideas, parts, and labor from many nations, and a piece of 
"Carribean" music likely blends traditions that have circulated back and forth 
between the United States and Africa as well as between the Islands. Friedman 
describes the label on a computer component: "This part was made in Malaysia, 
Singapore, the Philippines, China, Mexico, Germany, the U.S., Thailand, Canada, 
and Japan. It was made in so many different places that we cannot specify a 
country of origin" (2000: 40). In America's pervasively mailed, theme-parked, 
mediatized pop culture, "real things" turn out to be "simulated," and the 
postmodern "cultural dominant" is a mixture of fragmentation, rampant commer-
cialization, spectacle, playfulness, and hype. Especially, in the First World, 
however, globalized markets deliver a wider variety of products than ever before 
and often at good prices. 
If Jameson (1984) was correct that postmodernism was the "cultural logic of 
late capitalism," then what post-post term describes "fast capitalism's" far more 
dizzying pace and diversity? The accelerated movement and mixture of people 
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nearly matches that of goods and images. Global proletarianization uproots 
peasants formerly fixed to local spaces. In a radically unequal world, the push and 
pull of economic forces motivates the privileged as well as the poor to migrate. 
To compete for Indian computer engineers, Oracle of Silicon Valley installs an 
executive Indian cafeteria, with a tandoori oven, alongside ones for other groups 
(Cass 2000,67). In global cities, divergent immigrant populations forge multiple 
identities, hybrid offspring, and cultural fusions. Globalization's standardized 
goods "are locally consumed, read, and transformed," and its cultural flows move 
in divergent directions (Cox 1997; Hall 1997a; 1997b; Hall et al. 1999,283-326; 
Sassen 1998, xxx, 41-5; Held et al. 1999, 373; Giddens 2000, 34; Thurow 2000, 
27-8; Barber 1996). 
Yet globalization's nonplaces and hybridized pop culture bears a clear 
American imprint. American tourists often feel at home in these spaces, while 
locals experience, at least, a tinge of unease or displacement, even when they 
enjoy the consumption. The ironies of global pop culture's hybridized American 
accent are apparent in the tendency of both globalization advocates and critics 
(e.g., Friedman and Barber) to treat McDonald's as the prime symbol of 
"Americanization-Globalization."33 McDonald's of France has been a very 
contested terrain. Its web-site stresses that it customizes its operations for 
regional tastes. Averting total domestication of the corporate image or food, 
McDonald's managers are aware that their success derives from marketing 
Americana with the burgers and fries.34 However, its American identity makes the 
company a prime target for globalization critics. French outlets have been 
bombed, trashed, and protested; the latest dispute drew support not only from the 
French but worldwide from antiglobalization activists of diverse political 
persuasions.35 
Transnationalization: 
TNCs and the Globalization System 
Neoliberal globalization has been marked by waves of mergers and new 
types of corporate linkages and modes of concentration, which have increased the 
already substantial concentrations of private organizational power (Barber 1996, 
137-51; Prechel 1997). A major feature of this trend has been the expansion of 
transnational corporations (TNCs), the private sector's engine of globalization.36 
Multinational acquisitions and mergers between major corporations from differ-
ent nations (e.g., Chrysler and Mercedes-Benz) are an easily visible aspect of the 
process. But corporations have also expanded foreign direct investment (FDI), 
and created networks of global subsidiaries; FDI grew yearly at about 30 percent 
in the second half of the 1980s and more than doubled in the 1990s. Most FDI was 
in the United States and Europe, but it also increased sharply in developing 
countries. Consequently, a major part of world trade (e.g., 40 percent of U.S. 
imports) is between parent firms and subsidiaries (Gilpin 2000, 169-70). 
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Transnational, corporate collaborative arrangements are complex and var-
ied, going beyond ownership relations. For example, besides subsidiaries, TNCs 
often have flexible networks of separately owned, but dependent regular suppli-
ers. As Deane Neubauer points out in his article in this issue, development of new 
communication and information technologies, internationalization of key busi-
ness services, and major innovations in transportation facilitated TNCs expan-
sion and more diverse organizational arrangements.37 The major shift in invest-
ment patterns and corporate alliances has changed qualitatively the connections 
between national economies (Dicken 1998; Harrison 1994). The impacts of 
TNCs on host nations are varied and a matter of intense debate, but it appears to 
us indisputable that they have substantially increased capital's leverage with the 
state and labor (Ross 2000; Mittelman 2000,31-89; Held et al. 1999,280; Dicken 
1998, 243-77; Bonanno and Constance 1996). 
Some globalization advocates hold that the TNC-led fusion of new technolo-
gies and free markets have transformed nationally-based High Fordist, oligopoly 
capitalism into a "centerless" global capitalism—the world as web. In their view, 
the new economy is a fluid, seamlessly integrated space of free flowing informa-
tion, capital, and commodities, orchestrated by a global invisible hand. Yet TNCs 
are not "placeiess" or "deterritorialized" entities. Their parent firms are almost 
always embedded in a national and institutional home base, where their socio-
political connections and knowledge of local business, political, and cultural 
environments provide them comparative advantages (Dicken 1998, 193-200). 
Moreover, business infrastructure is unevenly distributed. Parent firms, home 
offices, and major subsidiaries usually have spatial roots in global cities, which 
are rich in information, communication, and financial resources; built environ-
ments; and pools of highly skilled workers, services, and other infrastructure that 
major businesses need to operate efficiently. These centers of corporate power 
restrict access to information, which is often their most valuable resource and 
commodity. Their "fire-walled" intranets hardly constitute an open web. Also, 
most TNCs are in the richest countries, where their owners and managers reside 
and which usually provide the best overall socio-economic, political, and legal 
bases for their operations. It is no surprise that the United States is the number one 
TNC host economy and home economy, that New York is the world's largest 
center of fiber-optic cable services, and that English is the globalization system's 
international language. For similar reasons, TNC subsidiaries and suppliers are 
also spread very unevenly (Gilpin 2000,165; Dicken 1998,177-200 Sassen 1998, 
184-94; 211). 
Globalization has reconfigured corporate geography into a new system of 
worldwide connections, but they are hardly decentered and fully integrated, and 
they remain hierarchical and unevenly distributed. Some critics see the transnational 
economy as an "empire" ruled by the United States, with strong support from its 
rich "G8" partners and assistance from segments of local elites and publics in 
other parts of the world (Hardt and Negri 2000,308-14; Harvey 2000,53-72). The 
imperial metaphor aside, the transnational system is, at least, partially a creation 
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of the U.S. state's neoliberal policies, its use of economic and military power, and 
the support given by U.S. allies. In a dispersed way and in the name of "economic 
development," TNCs and the globalization system benefit from state power and 
public resources. The neoliberal "free market" does not rule out copious state 
business assistance. 
Winner Take All Culture: 
Economic Inequality and Polarization 
Globalization advocates often admit that the process has increased economic 
inequality (e.g. Gilpin 1999,306-15). But they treat the problem as a footnote to 
an inevitable and generally fruitful process. Friedman acknowledges the extreme 
inequality by discussing the huge income gap between super-rich Michael Jordan 
and semi-rich, Joe Kleine, a marginal National Basketball Association (NBA) 
player, who benefits from and does not begrudge Jordan's well-earned success 
(which helped market the NBA globally) (2000, 306-24). Although expressing 
concern about the exceptional inequalities and emiseration in poor countries, 
Friedman brushes the matter aside with the argument that the only other option, 
a Cuban-style managed economy, impoverishes everyone.38 Avid cheerleaders of 
globalization hold that poor countries have no choice but to go global, and imply 
that consequent technological progress and an enlarged global middle-class will 
eventually make "all boats rise." Comfortable pundits claim that the roaring 
1990s U.S. stock boom is the "best economy ever" and that the strange mix of high 
growth and low unemployment with low inflation defies neoclassical theory's 
laws of motion (the demand for labor should cause wages to rise and inflation to 
increase). 
Thus, globalization advocates pronounce the emergence of a "new economy," 
"long boom," or "permanently high plateau" (e.g., Schwartz et al. 1999, 47). 
However, retaining neoclassical theory's libertarian presuppositions, they reject 
the idea that accelerated accumulation on top and stagnating or falling wages 
below might somehow be related and have something to do with a shift in power 
between capital and labor.39 By contrast, critics argue that capital's enhanced 
leverage over labor is the secret of the so-called new economy. In the heartlands 
of neoliberalism—the United States and United Kingdom—inequality grew 
sharply from the 1980s to the late-1990s (Mishel et al., 1999,12). In the United 
States, most wage earners had either stagnating or falling wages and family 
income stagnated, even though the numbers of hours worked increased substan-
tially. Regardless of increases in the federal minimum wage, its purchasing power 
has eroded by $2.00 per hour since 1968.40 By contrast, the richest 1 percent of 
families have good reason to concur with "best ever" assessments of the so-called 
new economy; their net worth increased on average from about $1 million to 
about $10 million between 1989 and 1997. The rest of the upper 20 percent also 
made substantial gains, and have good reason for their exuberant optimism.41 
However, the nearly one-third (32 percent) of American families that had a net 
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worth of $ 10,000 or less in 1997 had reason to disagree. The United States has the 
highest level of economic inequality, the least upward mobility for low wage 
workers, and the highest poverty rates of the leading economies. (Mishel et al. 
1999,9,12,23). These are the fruits of "the longest peacetime expansion without 
a recession in the nation's history" (Schwartz et al. 1999, 47). 
Polarized economic conditions are plainly visible in the built environments 
of American cities, where their rundown ghetto areas are separated from down-
town business, financial, and shopping complexes, elegant restaurants, and 
gentrified neighborhoods. Surveillance and security systems in privatized "pub-
lic" spaces, in gated neighborhoods, in upscale suburban malls, and in urban 
border zones exemplify applications of the new technologies that contradict the 
radically democratic uses described by New Age "webheads" (Davis 1992). The 
polarization is also visible in "winner-take-all-culture" that suffuses schools and 
workplaces, emphasizing ranks, embracing the stars, and nurturing status seeking 
and personal ambition (Frank and Cook 1995). Neoliberalism's self-congratula-
tory rhetoric about fostering "personal responsibility" among the poor absolves 
the well off from public responsibility. 
Economic inequality between the rich and poor nations is even more extreme 
than the sharp divides in American society. From 1989-1998, the poorest fifth of 
nations' share of global income fell from to 2.3 percent to 1.4 percent. Poor 
nations suffer from enormous crises in health care, environment, food, and 
infrastructure (Giddens 2000, 33-4). Globalization critics argue that the process 
has substantially enriched the world-wide upper strata and eroded wages, 
benefits, and working conditions for the rest of the majority of the world's 
people.42 They contend that class inequalities are hardened by status inequalities 
in a global workforce that added many women and racial minorities and employs 
much immigrant and informal labor. Emphasizing the abject poverty and misery 
of the poorest nations and poorest people, these critics charge that neoliberal 
policies hasten the famine, epidemics, and environmental disaster that loom on 
the horizon.43 
We do not, however, blame globalization for all the world's ills. Poverty and 
inequality arise from plural and complex causes, and measurement of the precise 
role of globalization in the growing economic polarization would be a daunting 
task. Rather, our point is that existing and growing intra- and international 
inequality is a reason to doubt globalization advocates' claims that neoliberal 
globalization represents the only way to a brighter future. Major U.S. political 
parties have dropped the postwar projects of reducing economic inequality and 
fighting poverty, holding that past efforts failed and that market-based growth is 
the only way to alleviate such problems. Twenty years of neoliberal policy 
suggests that the opposite is true, but the United States still exports theology to 
the rest of the world. 
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End of the Nation-State, or The Social State versus the 
Carcéral, Eco-Devo State 
"Hyperglobalist" thinkers, from left and right, contend that transnational 
capitalism, international governance, and hybrid global culture have effectively 
ended the modern nation- state. They claim that while the nation-state may retain 
its bureaucratic shell and many of its functions, globalization so greatly dimin-
ishes its regulatory capacities that it has lost any semblance of genuine autonomy 
(Held et al. 1999,3-5). In the globalization system, nation-states have numerous 
transnational connections and, thus, experience many external impacts that 
provide novel challenges to national sovereignty. However, nation-states still 
control legitimate forms of coercive force and law, govern much of the institu-
tional matrix for the global economy, and institute policies that can facilitate or 
resist globalization. Moreover, international governance is still very limited and 
uneven and is frequently strenuously resisted. Great powers, such the United 
States and the G8 nations, are hardly passive bystanders; they set the direction of 
globalization.44 
Yet the nation-state's regulatory and welfare arms, or social state, are a 
contested terrain under globalization. Neoliberals see the post-Wold War II social 
state as the cause of the worst rigidities, waste, and social problems (e.g., welfare 
dependency). They oppose social regulation, which holds the private sector 
accountable for its "externalities" (e.g., pollution), and progressive taxation, 
which redistributes resources downward and supports the social state. The 1970s 
arguments about the "overloaded" state and its contribution to a "revolution of 
rising expectations" foreshadowed a right turn that culminated in the politics of 
Thatcher and Reagan. American neoliberals fell short of their goals to radically 
roll back the social state, but they made much sharper reductions than were 
instituted in the European social democracies, which had larger social states. The 
United States was the only rich nation to reduce substantially the increasing rate 
of social spending from the 1970s through the 1990s. Entitlements benefiting the 
middle-class (e.g., Social Security) fared much better than means-tested pro-
grams for the poor, which were often cut to the bone or had their eligibility 
requirements stiffened. As Alejandra Marchevsky and Jeanne Theoharis point 
out in their article in this issue, the harsh treatment of the poor was animated, in 
part, by white middle-class resentment against increased tax burdens and by a 
racial politics that exploited the prejudicial stereotype of African Americans as 
"undeserving poor" who cause higher taxes and urban decline. Verging on Social 
Darwinism, the 1996 welfare reform legislation supported by Democratic Presi-
dent Clinton exemplified the radical break from the postwar "war on poverty" and 
"Great Society." (Bowles and Gintis: 1986; Harrison and Bluestone: 1988; Katz 
1989; Quadagno 1994; Wilson 1997; Noble 1997,104-34).45 Racial politics also 
built popular support for strengthening the internal security arm of the U.S. state; 
police forces and prison systems were expanded, prosecutors were favored, 
prison terms were lengthened, and the death penalty was used more widely. At the 
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millennium, the high U.S. rates of imprisonment and execution are unparalleled 
among rich nations. They also affect primarily poor people and disadvantaged 
minorities, especially African Americans. The increasingly "lean and mean" U.S. 
social state is also manifested in its health care system, which is the most 
expensive in the world, but leaves about 46 million citizens uninsured and many 
more with inadequate coverage.46 While the social state was slashed, corporations 
and the rich received major tax cuts, and developers and companies on the move 
benefited from economic development (Eco Devo) policies that provided gener-
ous public subsidies for private sector development. Such "public-private part-
nerships" subsidize upscale postmodern business-consumer-recreation-stadium 
complexes for the rich and professional middle-class and relegate to the poor what 
Foucault called "carcéral" cities-centers of surveillance and detention (Davis 
1992; Harvey 2000). 
By the mid-1980s, neoliberal globalization had also helped exhaust the 
postwar model of social democracy (Esping-Anderson 1985, 289-92). Beliefs 
that the social state is ineffective and cannot be sustained under globalization 
favors the "ratcheting down" of postwar era "social settlements" (Coates 2000, 
259).47 Yet neither markets nor nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have 
picked up the slack left by the diminished social state. Besides mounting misery 
and unmet needs among increasing numbers of very poor people, paralysis of the 
social state affects other areas. For example, extending and intensifying capitalist 
production and consumption has exacerbated environmental problems. As Black 
points out in his review of global environmental literature in this volume, the 
globalization system is itself threatened by potential environmental crises, such 
as resource depletion, toxic waste, global warming, pollution of air and ground 
water, and destruction of rainforests (Held et al. 1999, 376-413). Neoliberal 
theology's certainty about the virtues of a shrunken "Nanny State" and about the 
virtues of global free markets parallels the nascent Fordist "iron cage" that Weber 
feared would "determine" social life "until the last ton of fossilized coal is burnt" 
(1958:181). 
End of the Political: Neoliberal Hegemony and 
Convergence of Left and Right 
Post-World War II political discourse in advanced industrial democracies 
was characterized by a left-right continuum. Generally, major political parties 
ranged from those embracing market-centered Keynsianism and a semi-welfare 
state to those advocating social democracy and robust welfare state. Both models 
retained capitalism, but they posed substantially different alternatives. The 
Keynsian model stressed extending the social state to correct market imperfec-
tions, reduce insecurity, and avert economic and political crises. From this 
vantage, preservation of market-centered capitalism required modest social 
regulation, income and wealth redistribution, and decommodification. By con-
trast, the social democratic model called for more sweeping versions of these 
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measures, aiming to reduce class differences, increase capital's responsibilities, 
and move toward a mixed regime or market socialism (Esping-Anderson 1985, 
145-78).48 The critical point is that the postwar left-right continuum posed 
alternative policy frameworks for managing capitalist development and employ-
ing the social state democratically to regulate the market. 
Under neoliberal globalization, by contrast, policy regimes blur, parties 
converge, and left-right alternatives vanish. The authors of The Long Boom 
declare: "It's not about left and right; its about what works" (Schwartz et al. 1999, 
74) ; Louis Rossetto, editor and publisher of Wired, praises "the Digital Revolution's 
crucial left-right fusion of free minds and free markets" (2000,1); and Friedman 
asserts that the golden straightjacket forces everyone "toward America's gas 
station" and reduces their political choice to "Pepsi and Coke" (2000,105-6,380). 
Liberal Ulrich Beck describes a "paralysis" of right-left party politics; it is a 
"silent movie," he says—people "move their lips and pound the keyboards, but 
nothing comes out!"(Beck 1997, 149). Neo-Marxist Claus Offe (1996, 3-30) 
speaks of "zero options," and postmodernist Zygmunt Bauman (1992, 175-86) 
refers to "living without an alternative." Leading radical conservative Alain de 
Benoist (1995) holds that the postwar right and left are exhausted. In his view, 
neoconservatives and social democrats alike now serve global neoliberalism, 
handling affairs in nearly identical ways and offering no genuine alternatives. His 
New Right critique of the free market and globalization is ambiguous, sounding 
at critical points almost identical to left-leaning Barber's critique of McWorld 
(see Benoist 1996; 1998). 
Arguments about the "end of left and right" and similar "endings discourses" 
have been a major thread of interdisciplinary social theory since the late 1970s, 
multiplying in the wake of Fukuyama's "end of history" thesis and the centrist 
fusion politics of Clinton and Blair.49 These positions often speak of an end of 
modernity or history, but they expose a perceived exhaustion of the postwar-
Keynsian and social democratic visions of modernization and their related 
political ideologies, policy regimes, and reforms. Although some of these 
commentators see creative and fresh political forces emerging from the erosion 
of postwar politics, most portray depoliticization and gridlock, contending that 
neoliberal globalization gives so much power to markets and capital that social 
states are forced into full-fledged and even irreversible retreat and, as a conse-
quence, major social problems are left to fester.50 
Return of the Political: Resistance to Neoliberal Globalization 
Globalization critics argue that a market crisis would have almost instanta-
neous impact on today's wired and closely intertwined worldwide financial 
markets. Fast moving ripple effects occurred at the peak of the recent Asian crisis, 
but they did not generate a major crisis of the globalization system. A substantial 
erosion of U.S. markets, however, would likely have more serious consequences, 
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because of the nation's central role in global capitalism.51 If the new technologies 
are not the basis of a new economy, but are, instead, a high tech version of earlier 
technical revolutions that generated similar initial surges of profit and optimism 
and later ran their course, then we can expect a cyclical erosion of profits and 
eventual economic, political, and social crises. In the absence of such an erosion, 
however, festering social problems, weakening political legitimacy, and growing 
dissatisfaction (felt by the people being squeezed economically and socially) 
could still generate major political opposition to continued neoliberal hegemony. 
In the United States, neoliberal policy has dominated since the early 1980s, and, 
in some circles, its promises have begun to fade. Finally, Barber (1996,155-300) 
and others argue that globalization's destabilizing impacts have already gener-
ated opposition from local cultures and led to "retribalization"—a centrifugal 
wave of populist struggles for regional or group identity, autonomy, and power 
that range from democratic efforts to preserve a community or secure group 
recognition (e.g., saving a dialect or defending an indigenous people's corporate 
rights) to bloody and even genocidal warfare (conflicts in Rwanda, the former 
Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, and Northern Ireland or European neo-Nazis and U.S. 
white supremacists). At the millennium, such resistance grows ever more self-
conscious and the very idea of globalization is contested by a new populist politics 
of right and left. 
Manifesting broader retribalization, right-wing populism (e.g., French Na-
tional Front, the Italian Northern League, and U.S. Neoconfederate groups) 
occurs worldwide. Finishing second in the 1999 Austrian elections and forming 
a center-right government with a more conventional conservative party, Jorg 
Haider's Freedom Party brought ascendent radical right politics to world's 
attention. The European "New Right," which borrows heavily from Weimar-era 
radical conservatism, poses sharp critiques of neoliberal globalization.52 Simi-
larly, U.S. "paleoconservatives" charge that neoconservatives, neoliberals, and 
liberals are all lackeys of the new world order.53 New Right intellectuals attack 
economism, rationalism, multiculturalism, and human rights. Many embrace 
Weimar era, radical conservative Carl Schmitt's view that Anglo-American 
economics, equal rights, liberal institutions, and individualism annihilate the 
cultural bases for coherent identity, community, and political unity and allow 
global capitalism to evaporate cultural difference. Schmitt saw Marxism's 
economistic egalitarianism as a more collectivist and regimented version of the 
same utilitarian ethos.54 Martin Heidegger also warned that liberalism and 
Marxism were "metaphysically the same," causing a "darkening of the world" or 
total cultural homogenization ([1953] 1961, 37). The New Right revives these 
views in a postmodern racial identity politics that claims to defend the "the right 
to difference" and resist cultural hegemony. Their so-called "ethnopluralism" 
holds that sending immigrants home resists globalization and saves indigenous 
cultures.55 They contend that cultural survival depends on returning politics to its 
rightful dominance over markets and empowering ethnic particularity as the 
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bulwark against homogenizing neoliberal globalization. European radical con-
servatives call for federated ethnic states, with ethnically-based citizenship, while 
U.S. paleoconservatives call for a white Christian republic to "take back the 
nation." These thinkers want to forge an authoritarian communitarian order that 
scuttles liberal rights and excludes ethnic others. Although unlikely to attain 
power under current conditions, the radical right strengthens the broader nation-
alist, nativist, racist, and antidemocratic tendencies that block efforts to cope with 
inequality and the harmful consequences of neoliberal globalization. 
On the left, during the 1970s, "new social movements" (NSMs) shifted the 
focus of critique from capitalism and redistribution to culture and the state.56 
Environmental groups opened new dialogues about top-down planning and 
unsustainable, harmful development policies, while identity politics mobilized 
racial and ethnic groups, lesbians and gays, women, and other minorities against 
cultural exclusion and disparagement. NSM advocates held that the postwar left's 
one-sided class politics and reliance on the state and planning ignored or 
exacerbated environmental and cultural problems. However, opposing thinkers 
countered that the NSMs' diverse agendas were too fragmented to forge a 
common politics or to address economic inequality and, especially, the problems 
of the poorest people and nations.57 But signs of a new left alliance politics 
emerged suddenly in 1999 and 2000, in the Seattle, Davos (Switzerland), and 
Washington DC protests against the WTO, IMF, World Bank, and other U.S.-
dominated governance organs of the global economy.58 The trial of the group that 
trashed the French McDonald's (to protest globalized industrial food) drew 
similar left groups together in June 2000 (Truehart 2000; Associated Press 2000). 
These collective actions fused cultural politics with critiques of capitalism and 
focused attention of diverse groups on the impacts of neoliberal globalization. 
Globalization advocates hold that the groups are too ragtag and diverse to be 
effective, but their sarcastic rejections of the protests betray a fear of the new 
alliance politics (e.g., Friedman 2000, 334-6). 
It is possible that these protests were one-time actions, cultural happenings, 
and media events, and it is too soon to tell if they are the start of a new political 
realignment or reconstitution of the left. However, they represent a step toward 
the broad alliance politics that NSM theorists have praised abstractly but have 
seldom, if ever, executed in practice. Globalization's diffuse and varied impacts 
touch most NSM groups in some way and provide natural bridges for alliance 
politics. The protests brought together a multinational assortment of cultural 
movements and labor unions that for a moment overcame the divides of recent 
left-leaning politics. Communicating, acting in common, confronting police 
forces, and responding to media coverage builds bonds that could lead to future 
actions and more permanent organization. Unions have more female and minority 
members and officers today, and are more able, than in the postwar era, to bridge 
the cultural and political differences with NSMs. Moreover, neoliberal 
globalization has proletarianized large numbers of women and minorities. 
Leading women's groups are already highly organized and have international 
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connections, and could emerge as a crucial site of resistance and links to other 
groups.59 Major environmental groups and certain minority group organizations 
have similar potential. Information and communications technologies, which are 
the infrastructure for implementation of (post)-Fordist rationalization, also serve 
as transnational links for groups that resist globalization. The collective actions, 
media coverage, web-links, and new discourses may be the start of the "global 
civil society" that Barber holds must precede the creation of democratic gover-
nance structures to socially and culturally mediate globalization (1996,276-88). 
The media were bemused by the presence of Pat Buchanan at the April 2000 
Washington, D.C., demonstrations against the WTO, World Bank, and Clinton 
China policy, especially that he attacked neoliberal globalization along with 
socialist congressman Bernard Sanders (I-VT), Amnesty International, and other 
representatives of the left (Montgomery 2000). The emergent poles of 
paleoconservative economic nationalism and left alliance politics have not yet 
registered fully in a media still attuned to the postwar political order. Regardless 
of the fate of these polar groups, they both treat "neoliberal democracy" as a 
"Stockholders' Republic" and call for it to be replaced by a "Stakeholders' 
Republic."60 Globalization critics of both the left and the right (e.g., Barber and 
Benoist) discussed in this essay both argue that effective power is monopolized 
by the richest institutions and strata and that ordinary citizenship and participation 
are separated by high economic gates. Both groups want a revived state to address 
economic exclusion, re-embed the economy politically, and regulate it in accord 
with noneconomic interests. Thus, they both break with the ahistorical economism 
(stressing timeless, abstract economic laws in isolation from socio-cultural 
affairs) and the libertarian individualism of neoclassical theory and neoliberalism. 
Once again they raise the question of regime, which goes back to Gramsci and 
before. However, radical conservatives' virulently antiliberal views of citizen-
ship, individual rights, and political institutions promise to erect new and higher 
cultural and racial gates and a harsher monocultural regime. 
By contrast, today's emergent left alliance politics aims at a more inclusive, 
egalitarian stakeholders' society. Some of this group (e.g., Barber) hold that the 
fate of democracy depends on rethinking liberalism and reconstructing its 
conceptions of citizenship, human rights, and participation in light of the new 
global interdependence and in a manner that improves the provision for general 
human needs and better protects communities and the earth. Such critics do not 
oppose globalization, per se. This vision is not shared by all globalization critics 
and it hardly constitutes a concrete policy regime, but the aspirations to mesh 
economic globalization with social justice, environmental sanity, and reduced 
misery provide a welcome starting point for a new conversation about democra-
tizing globalization. The first step of this project requires a methodological shift 
in public policy discourse to an approach that acknowledges the "economy" as a 
social domain embedded in a still larger socio-cultural complex. As in the early 
days of the republic and the debates over the question of Jeffersonian or 
Hamiltonian courses of development, the matter of capitalism must be treated as 
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part of the overall question of democracy. Today this issue requires an even 
broader and more difficult move beyond the early republic's noninclusive and 
partial democratization of political life to a wider and more inclusive democra-
tization of politics, social life, and culture that rethinks the nation in a global 
context. 
On the verge of the Great Depression, John Dewey ([1929] 1988: 49) 
asserted that: the "spiritual factor of our [American] tradition... is obscured and 
crowded out. . . . [and instead of the] individualities which it prophetically set 
forth, there is a perversion of the whole ideal of individualism to conform to . . . 
pecuniary culture." In his view, vaunted American individual liberty had come to 
justify "inequalities and oppressions." We close by suggesting that our current 
gridlock and incapacity to address mounting inequalities has serious implications 
for the legitimacy, meaning, and vibrancy of American democracy and, indeed, 
the prospect of it ever becoming realized according to its inclusive ideals of liberty 
and equality. Facing the bad economic times of the 1930s and ascendent Stalinism 
and Fascism, Dewey warned that a noninclusive, merely formally free, and 
unequal liberalism that equates democracy with formal rights and free markets 
might be unable sustain liberal democratic institutions in a world suffering from 
economic crisis and facing ascendent authoritarian regimes around the globe. 
Dewey contextualized the grave economic problems and new political threats of 
the Depression years within the broader question of a democratic socio-cultural 
regime. In his view, a strong economy and genuine democracy require a just, 
inclusive, and habitable social order and free culture rather than merely economic 
growth and individual rights. Consequently, he argued that the times required a 
rethinking of liberalism and refashioning of democracy to make them truer to 
their ideals and return it them to the status of a "fighting faith" (Dewey [1935] 
1987). 
Dewey's words may sound anachronistic, anomalous, or even naive in these 
blasé postmodern times. The issue of the meaning and reality of democracy is 
today seldom discussed because neoliberalism has so extended the private realm 
that the public sphere either disappears or is simply treated as a realm of waste and 
malfeasance. For much of the American middle-class, real individual freedom 
entails the abundant delivery of fine goods and images and the ecstatic joys and 
possibilities of communication on the web. But the downside of neoliberal 
globalization is easy to see when one steps out of such these restricted domains, 
in which most of us who read and write about such things are included. Dewey's 
words have a more felicitous tone for those who make this step and ask for 
something more. 
Notes 
1. The authors are listed in alphabetic order. We wish to thank our colleague Norman Yetman 
for discussions of this topic over the years and for his work on several drafts of this paper, which has 
improved our argument and narrative. We are very grateful for insights we have received from 
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Professor Mohamed El Hodiri, expert on the "religious" factor in the neoclassical revival in American 
economics and on the problems of neoliberal restructuring in Russia and the Third World and to Dr. 
Duke Kent who has long persuasively articulated the merits of regime analysis. 
2. For some sources, we will employ the original dates of writing or publication in brackets, 
at least once, to inform readers of the approximate historical sequence of important ideas. 
3. Contemporary work in cultural theory and cultural studies varies widely. Some studies that 
employ Gramscian ideas converge theoretically with those described in this essay, but others deploy 
Gramsci in "post-Marxist" moves that displace capitalism as a core focus of analysis and criticism, 
or ignore it entirely. Gramsci posed his theory as part of an effort to promote working class solidarity 
and national unification and to create a socialist regime. The reappropriation of Gramscian thought 
and its relation to cultural theory and to the Marxian tradition has long been a contested terrain. Two 
qualifications are in order: first, by contrast to many recent Fordists and post-Fordists, Gramsci 
himself believed in Marxist politics; second, other thinkers, besides Gramsci and Marx have 
influenced the Fordists and post-Fordists discussed below. For example, Karl Polanyi ([1944] 1957) 
is especially important, and early twentieth century American institutionalists, such as Thorstein 
Veblen, Clarence E. Ayres, and John R. Commons, have also been influential. 
4. Gramsci elaborated his notion of Fordism while imprisoned in Mussolini ' s Fascist Italy (see 
Hoare and Smith 1971). Arrested for his political views in 1926, Gramsci was sentenced to twenty 
years. Released in 1935 because of his deteriorating health, he died in 1937 at age 46. See Marx ([1867] 
1996, 341-508) for discussion of the shift from manufacture to modern industry. 
5. Frederick Winslow Taylor's ([1911] 1947) principles of rationalizing production through 
"scientific management" were never fully implemented. However, his name came to be associated 
with actual practices employed in the development of Fordism, which followed his call to employ 
rigorous, systematic, rational—"scientific"—procedures and methods of calculation to maximize 
efficiency. "Taylorist" methods separated mental and physical labor and shifted power to regulate and 
plan the work process from the shop floor to managers and technical personnel, who designed 
machinery and routines with the aim of gaining technical control over production and maximizing 
return on invested capital (Braverman 1974, 85-183; Clawson 1980, 202-53). 
6. For more detailed argument and documentation about "High Fordism" and its decline, see 
Antonio and Bonanno (1996, 4-8). 
7. For overviews of the expanded role of the High Fordist state see Heilbroner (1993,149-65); 
Kolko (1976, 310-47); O'Connor (1973); Noble (1997, 79-134). 
8. Neoconservatives claimed that they aimed to restore liberty and meritocracy, eliminate 
wasteful and inefficient social programs, reduce economic and environmental regulation, cut taxes, 
and scale down unreasonable expectations (i.e., of the lower classes, minorities, and women), revive 
traditional values and religion, and insure "law and order"(i.e., employ force to control the shiftless 
underclass. Compare Hodgson's ( 1978,67-98) summary of the High Fordism's "liberal consensus"with 
Steinfels' (1979, 25-69) description of the neoconservative views. 
9. On the "end of consensus," see the special issue of Daedalus (Summer 1980); Hodgson 
(1976, 263-499). 
10. We will map today's neoliberal capitalism below. See Brohman (1996,9-34), for a concise 
summary that contrasts neoliberal development theory with postwar modernization theory; see the 
rest of his book for a detailed account and many examples of global neoliberal policy. 
11. Bell argued that a media-based, "cultural class" of transmitters and vendors of mass culture 
(i.e., the leading segment of the dominant "new class" of knowledge and communication workers) 
made "everything permissible" (Bell 1980, 154-64). 
12. Regime of capitalism is our term for the "economy" (i.e., the mode of production and 
exchange), which is itself a socio-cultural domain, and the larger socio-cultural complex of structures 
and processes (e.g., aspects of the state, family, media) upon which economic affairs depend and in 
which they are "embedded." We do not suggest a deterministic base-superstructure model, but imply 
mutual interaction between the "economy" and its socio-cultural matrix. By contrast to neoclassical 
economic theory and neoliberalism, which stress universal principles and laws, regime analysis treats 
capitalism as a variable socio-cultural complex dependent on its specific historical context. For 
example, see Hollingsworth and Boyer (1997). 
13. For American studies of capitalism popular at this time, see Baran and Sweezy (1966); 
Gutman ([1966] 1977); Chandler (1977); Edwards (1979); Montgomery (1979); Herman (1981); for 
detailed treatment of the U.S. context, see Attewell (1984); and for some important European works, 
see E. P, Thompson.(1963); Braudel ([1966] 1973); Anderson (1974a; 1974b); Hobsbawn (1975). 
14. On dependency theory, see Frank (1969) and Amin (1974). On world systems theory, see 
Wallerstein (1974; 1980; 1988). Dependency theory faded in the early 1980s, but world systems 
theory has flourished as a specialized area in sociology. Although related to themes discussed in this 
paper, world systems theory represents a different branch of thought. In particular, it stresses relations 
in the global system, and does not focus on the overall national regimes that compose it. 
15. The Russian economist N.D. Kondratieff developed the idea of long waves in the 1920s. See 
(Attewell 1984, 190-92). On long waves and the history of capitalism, see Mandel (1978, 108-46). 
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16. For discussion ofFordism and post-Fordism, see e.g., Amin( 1994a); Kumar(1995,36-65); 
Allen (1996), and Bonanno and Constance (1996). Some thinkers argue that post-Fordism and the 
related concept of globalization are inadequate tools for analyzing changes in capitalism; e.g., Arrighi 
(1998); Gordon (1996); Hirst and Thompson (1996); Kiely (1998). Other critics maintain that 
distinctions between Fordism and post-Fordism have been greatly exaggerated; e.g., Friedland 
(1994a; 1994b); Prechel.(1994). And others argue that the concepts are too broad or too totalizing; 
e.g. Arce (1997); Long and Long (1992); Goodman and Watts (1996). 
17. Also see Sabel (1982; 1994). Hirst and Zeitlin (1989; 1991; 1997) try to decouple flexible 
specialization from overall critiques of Fordism. They argue that the very idea of post-Fordism 
manifests a totalizing type of production-centered theory, rooted in Marxism. However, they still 
suggest that flexible specialization is displacing mass production as the "dominant paradigm" in 
production and imply an erosion of the larger social order in which the old system of production was 
embedded (including Marxism's totalizing productivism). For critique of the Third Italy thesis and 
the Piore and Sable position, see Harrison (1994, 3-122), and Amin (1994b, 13-16). 
18. For detailed analysis and critique of Aglietta and comparison to Mandel, see Davis (1978). 
19. On the historical context, see the special issue of The Annals Of the American Academy of 
the Political and Social Science (475, September 1984) on "Deindustrialization and Restructuring the 
Economy." On restructuring and erosion of the middle class during the 1980s and early 1990s, see, 
e.g., Thurow (1981 ; 1984); Bluestone and Harrison (1982); Bowles and Gintis (1986); Kennedy 1987; 
Harrison and Bluestone (1988); Newman (1989; 1993); Kuttner(1991); Reich (1991); Phillips (1991; 
1994); Schor (1992); Harrison (1994); New York Times (1996); Rubin (1996). 
20. See the former IMF chief economist, Joseph Stiglitz's (2000) revealing account of his 
associates' narrowness and unwillingness to entertain opposing perspectives. Also, see Moberg 
(2000) on the aftermath of Stiglitz's public critique of the IMF and Institute of Advanced Studies in 
Culture (2000) for a report of research on globalization advocates that supports Stiglitz' s contentions. 
21. Fukuyama feared a resurgent far right rebellion against prosaic market-centered culture. In 
later books, he warns about depleted "social capital" in the United States. He states that "neoclassical 
or free market economists" are "eighty percent correct" (i.e., about their "fundamental model of 
rational, self-interested human behavior"), but he argues that the gap in their vision causes them to 
overlook the economy's socio-cultural foundations and vital social resources needed to regenerate 
U.S. community life as well as strengthen the economy (1996:13; 1999). 
22. Leading cultural theorist Richard Rorty holds that globalization's prime consequences are 
ethnic warfare and "Brazilianization" (rule by an international "overclass" that enriches the top 20 
percent and immiserates everyone else), which have dimmed the left's faith in "alternative scenarios." 
Although he still urges the left to maintain hopes for a "global egalitarian Utopia," he implies that there 
are no practical means to resist the current pattern of globalization. Rorty advises concerned 
intellectuals to convince "educated publics" about the need to create a "global state" that can assert 
"countervailing power" against rule by the "super rich," but he admits that the chances of such a 
strategy succeeding are "slim" (1999, 230-4). 
23. For a parallel British perspective, see Micklethwait and Wooldridge (2000). For an extreme 
example of American optimism, see Schwartz, Ley den, and Hayatt ( 1999). For a critique, see Gimein 
(2000) and Henwood (1998; 2000). 
24. Representative of the glowing media kudos appearing inside the front cover and on the 
book's back: The New York Times praises its "vivid images and compelling analogies," and 
"Breathtaking . . . exhilarating . . . spirited and imaginative exploration of our new order of 
globalization." 
25. The title of Barber's book and its cover—a Muslim woman wearing a chadora and holding 
a Pepsi—have both been criticized. But the title is about the only cliché in his book. Friedman does 
not address Barber's work, even though it was published earlier and was also written for a popular 
audience. 
26. The report is on work by the University of Virginia's James Davidson Hunter and Joshua 
Yates, leaders of the study's U.S. component. See Institute for Advanced Studies in Culture (2000). 
27. Our colleague Mohamed El-Hodiri has long argued that U.S. neoclassical economists treat 
their "first principles" as unimpeachable Truths and are the prime architects of the late twentieth-
century American "state religion"—neoliberalism. See Pierre Bourdieu's and Loïc Wacquant's 
charges that neoliberalism is an imperialist U.S. "sociodicy." (Bourdieu 1998,34-6,94-105; Bourdieu 
and Wacquant 1999). For the intense debate over their attack on Americanization-globalization, see 
Theory, Culture and Society (Volumes 16[1] 1999 and 17[1] 2000). 
28. For an enchanted view of the fusion of markets and technology, see Schwartz et al. (1999); 
Levine et al. (2000); or Fast Company magazine, which can be accessed on-line (read its manifesto; 
Founding Editors 1995). For critical coverage of these sensibilities, see Stephenson (1997); Gray 
(1998,100-32); Cox (1999); Gimein (1999); Stossel (2000). On U.S. technological utopianism, see 
Rifkin (1996,3-56); (2000); and on the social views and life-style of new economy professionals, see 
Leinberger and Tucker (1991); Brooks (2000); Cass (2000). 
29. Micklethwait and Wooldridge contend that the "broad church" of neoliberalism rests on two 
"fundamental principles": the primacy of the individual over the group and state, on the one hand, and 
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individual choice as "the essence of freedom," on the other (2000, 336). On high tech and web 
libertarianism, see Barbrook and Cameron (2000); Rossetto (2000); Borsook (2000); Ullman (2000); 
Kamiya (1997); Schwartz (1999: et al., 63-89). 
30. Anderson states that: "The winning formula to seal the victory of the market is not to attack, 
but to preserve, the placebo of a compassionate public authority, extolling the compatibility of 
competition with solidarity. The hard core of government policies remain further pursuit of the 
Reagan-Thatcher legacy, on occasion with measures their predecessors did not dare enact: welfare 
reform in the United States, student fees in the United Kingdom. But it is now carefully surrounded 
with subsidiary concessions and softer rhetoric" (2000, 11). 
31. We use "gated" to refer to privatized spaces that require money or other status-based 
characteristics (e.g., gender, race, ethnicity) for entry. Neoliberals generally support removing status-
based "gates" but advocate monetary ones. They support commodification or privatization of public 
spaces (imposition of fees for entry), but they continue to speak of these private spaces (e.g., Internet) 
as if they were public and open to everyone. According to their libertarian view, monetary gates are 
a private matter and do not diminish democracy. 
32. See Kern (1983) on the late nineteenth and early twentieth century time-space rupture and 
cultural impact of its major technical innovations, such as the wireless, telephone, cinema, automo-
bile, and airplane. See Holton (2000) on global homogenization, polarization, and hybridization of 
culture. 
33. See George Ritzer's McDonaldization of Society (2000). 
34. An Italian friend of the authors, replying to a very puzzled query about taking her 9-year-
old daughter to Pizza Hut of Florence (a great center of regional Italian cuisine), explained that the 
child loved the experience of the American climate of the chain restaurant and that the food, although 
not pizza, was familiar enough to the child to be edible. 
35. Twenty thousand people demonstrated at the June 30th, 2000, opening of the trial of Jose 
Bove and his associates, who destroyed a half-built McDonald's outlet. A critic of U.S. industrial and 
genetically altered food and hero of globalization critics, Bove and his group acted in protest of the 
WTO's ruling against France's unwillingness to import U.S. hormone-laced beef and to sell it without 
an explanatory label and retalitory U.S. economic sanctions. Polls showed wide support for Bove from 
the French people, including the conservative Prime Minister Chirac and socialist President Jospin. 
Other attacks on French McDondald's outlets included a bombing that killed one person (Associated 
Press 2000; Trueheart 2000). 
36. A TNC firm has "the power to coordinate and control operations in more than one country, 
even if it does not own them" (Dicken 1998,177). TNCs often combine a nationally-based parent firm 
with a network of entirely or partially owned subsidiaries in two or more other countries and with other 
separately owned and globally dispersed suppliers (Gilpin 2000, 164). 
37. TNCs' global spread requires networks, but they often combine divergent organizational 
forms (e.g., flexible specialization, pre-Fordist manufacture, and Fordist bureaucracy) to utilize most 
(cost)effectively the diverse resources and opportunities of different national and regional settings. 
TNC operations can be decentralized to subsidiaries, subcontracted to different firms, globally 
sourced in open markets, or carried out in-house through production strategies, which may or may not 
resemble Fordist ones. Neoliberal globalization's new organizational form—a "vertically disinte-
grated flexible network organization"—refers to a parent company with a network of mostly smaller 
and separately owned firms, which radically restructures and inverts High Fordism's dominant 
vertically integrated firm (Harrison 1994; Dicken 1998, 201-42; Bonanno and Constance 2000). 
3 8. Friedman does not mention that Cuba's economic plight is in part a consequence of the U.S. 
trade embargo and American political efforts to undermine Cuba's trade relations with other nations 
and to isolate it economically and politically. Moreover, he does not mention Cuba's delivery of health 
care, education, and general subsistence to a wider range of people than many other poor countries. 
Nor does he does consider the possibility that many of Cuba's internal problems may derive from 
political dictatorship, rather than the managed economy per se. 
39. George Ross argues that labor has been weakened across the globe and is the major loser 
under neoliberal globalization. He argues that transnational labor cooperation is very difficult (2000). 
40. In 1999 a full-time minimum wage worker in the United States earned slightly less than 
$11,000, compared to slightly less than $15,000 (inflation adjusted ) in 1968. In 1999, the official 
poverty line for a single parent family with two children was $13,423 (Bernstein and Schmitt 2000, 
2-3). By contrast, average compensation packages for CEO's at major U.S. corporations have leaped 
from 44 times the average factory worker's pay during 1965 to 419 times during 1998 (O'Sullivan 
2000, 159). 
41. Between 1989-1997, inflation adjusted hourly wages fell for about 60 percent of the U.S. 
workforce, and a median worker's earnings fell about 3.1 percent. During the same period, the total 
number of hours worked per year for the typical married family with children increased 368 hours, 
making it the longest work year among the rich countries. In this period, the percentage of jobs paying 
wages below the poverty line remained static, but poverty increased from 12.8 percent to 13.3 percent 
(Mishel et al., 1999, 2-3, 5, 9, 382). From 1989-1997, the middle 20 percent of households lost 2.9 
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percent of their net worth. By contrast, the wealthiest 1 percent households increased their net worth 
by about 11.3 percent. In 1997, these families controlled 39.1 percent of the nation's total net wealth 
(increasing 5.3 points since 1983), and, between 1989 and 1997, the top 10 percent of households 
received about 86 percent of the increased stock market values. Corporate profits or returns on 
invested capital have been at historic highs, and are the primary basis of the increased accumulation 
among the upper strata. Mishel et al. estimate "conservatively" that 30 to 40 percent of the increased 
wage inequality derives from globalization and related shifts to low wage industry (1999,20-3). For 
updates on some of the material mentioned above, go to the Economic Policy Institute's "quarterly 
wage and employment series" online at http://www.epinet.org. For comprehensive treatment of 
economic inequality in the United States, see Mishel et al. (1999), and on American and global 
inequality, see Carruthers and Babb (2000,101-41); Perrucci and Wysong (1999); Gray (1998,100-
32);Braun(1997). 
42. For example, in 2000, AIDS infection rates in the United States were 0.61 percent of the 
population, while figures were more than 10 percent in 16 sub-Saharan African nations and 20 percent 
or above in six of them. The rates are still climbing, and little is being done to stem them. Differences 
in life expectancy between rich and poor countiries are also exceptionally polarized. In the top nation, 
Japan, life expectancy is 74.5 years and in the lowest, Sierra Leone it is 25.9 years (Gellman 2000; 
Brown 2000). For an opposing optimistic view, see Easterlin (2000). 
43. On these various matters related to global inequality, see Coates 2000, 251-9; Mittelman 
2000, 74-89; Bauman 1998; Gray 1998, 78-165; Sassen 1998, 81-131; Wallimann 1998: Greider 
1998. 
44. Paraphrasing Marx, powerful countries make history, but not just as they please. Even the 
United States faces certain unintended, unwanted consequences of globalization. However, the scope 
and nature of external impacts and constraints on sovereignty still vary according to a state's place 
in the globalization system and its power, wealth, social movements, and institutional complex. For 
broader examination of the complex relation between the state and globalization, see Dicken (1998, 
79-144); Held et al., (1999, 32-148). 
45. The Clinton administration's welfare-to-work legislation made reference to "self-suffi-
ciency," but made no attempt to define it except for movement from public support to a job. The 
legislation set up no mechanisms to track the actual adjustment of former welfare recipients. This 
"successful" legislation has, as intended, reduced welfare roles. Preliminary studies demonstrate that 
many of these workers go into low-wage poverty level employment (Tongier 2000). 
46. A recent World Health Organization study ranked the United States 37th in the quality of 
its health system, even though it is the most costly (World Health Organization 2000; Star News 
Services 2000). 
47. Other rich countries have not experienced the growth of inequality or reductions of the 
social state that have occurred in the core neoliberal states of the United States and the United 
Kingdom. Most European social democracies have traded off higher unemployment (maintaining 
postwar types of full-time employment) rather than to shift to the flexible types of labor that reduce 
wages. But many thinkers argue that erosion has begun in these states as well and that the remains of 
postwar institutions will not hold: Offe (1996); Gray (1998, 78-99); Coates (2000,191-264). 
48. These caveats qualify our points about the left-right continuum; first, postwar Keynesianism 
and social democracy signify polar ideal types within mainstream discourse among the rich countries; 
second, politics of a single nation often shifted along the continuum; third, actual political poles varied 
in different countries (e.g., postwar U.S. politics was centered on the right side of the continuum); 
fourth, parties sometimes went beyond the continuum. On left-right battles in postwar Europe, see 
Esping-Anderson (1985); Przeworski (1986); Anderson and Camiller (1994); Sassoon (1996). 
49. On endings discourses, see Antonio (1998; 2000); for divergent examples, see Baudrillard 
(1994); Giddens (1994); Feher (1995); Bobbio (1996); Rorty (1998); Jacoby (1999). 
50. We agree with critics about the gaps of postwar politics, and about the substantial 
achievements of cultural politics (e.g., women's or gay and lesbian rights). We are not affirming 
postwar politics. 
51. The U.S. dollar is central to the global economy, and its financial markets hold a great deal 
of the world's finance capital. Moreover, stock ownership is more widespread and important in the 
United States than in the other rich countries, and its significance has grown during the 1990s stock 
boom as wider segments of the middle-class invested directly in the stock market or indirectly through 
pension funds. Low interest rates and beliefs in a long boom have led many middle-class people to 
have low savings and to maximize their stock market investments. Gray argues that stock market 
crises have been a regular facet of U.S. history, and that a significant one today (similar in scale to 
Japan's 1989 crash and weak recovery) would impoverish segments of the U.S. middle-class and 
cause serious instability (1998, 218-26). Instability in the land of global hegemon could destabilize 
the entire globalization system. 
52. Weimar era radical conservatives (e.g., Martin Heidegger, Carl Schmitt, Ernst Jiinger) 
developed incisive cultural critiques of liberal democracy and capitalism, calling for a revolution from 
the right. They attacked bourgeois individualism, instrumental rationality, and liberal democratic 
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pluralism, urging a recovery of ethnic culture, mythology, and organic community and a militarization 
of life. Radical conservatives contributed to cultural currents that led to fascism and Nazism. The 
1980s and 1990s brought a major revival of interest in their thought. On radical conservatism old and 
new, see Dahl (1999). 
53. France's Alain de Benoist is the leading theorist of the New Right, and American Pat 
Buchanan is the most visible paleoconservative. On the worldwide revival of far right, populist-
nationalist movements, see Betz and Immerfall (1998). For examples of New Right and 
paleoconservative thought, see Francis (1993); Benoist (1996; 1998); Buchanan (1998); Gottfried 
(1999), andfor analyses of these approaches, see Sunic (1990); Holmes (1996); Dahl (1999); Antonio 
(2000). 
54. Schmitt saw genuine politics to be based on a "friend-enemy" dichotomy anchored in 
deeply rooted shared culture and a common identity and in self-conscious opposition to divergent 
cultures. In his view, socially-constituted ethnic and racial differences provide the type of sharp 
cultural opposition that generates strong collective identity and great politics. Schmitt wanted a 
culturally and politically unified order that would end what he considered to be nihilistic, individu-
alistic, fragmentary, liberal democratic pluralism and political competition. He supported the Nazi 
regime in its early years and was, for a time, the regime's "crown jurist" (Schmitt [1932] 1996). 
55. Heidegger influenced key members of the Frankfurt School (e.g., Adorno) and almost all 
the French Poststructuralists (e.g., Foucault). Thus, their cultural criticism converges at key points 
with radical conservatism, but they diverge sharply over the matters of collective subjectivity and 
politics (i.e., radical conservatism's organic communitarianism and protofascism). But the borders 
between the cultural left and radical conservatism have been sometimes blurred and fluid. The far right 
and cultural left share an extreme antipathy to bourgeois culture, and constitute a horseshoe-shaped 
political continuum. As happened in the Weimar era, some thinkers make the short jump from one pole 
to the other. Today, Benoist claims to be beyond left and right, and recruits refugees from the cultural 
left to write for his journal Elements. He now writes regularly for the U.S. journal, Telos, which in the 
1970s and early-1980s brought the Frankfurt School to the United States and published postmodernist 
Jean Baudrillard's first English translations. Starting in the mid-1980s, however, Telos embraced 
Schmitt, the New Right, and paleoconservatism. Telos is now allied with the paleoconservative 
Rockford Institute and the populist right, a prospect unthinkable in the 1970s. 
56. NSMs refer to the left-leaning social movements (i.e., environmentalism and various forms 
of identity politics) that came into prominence in the 1970s and 1980s, after the decline of the labor-
centered postwar left, Marxism, and the New Left. 
57. NSMs are a debated topic. Supporters see them as new forms of radically democratic 
collective action (e.g., Giddens 1994; Beck 1997). Moderate critics argue that NSM's progressive 
aspects are countered by their tendency to split the left and underplay economic injustice (e.g., Gitlin 
1995; Rorty 1998; Zizek 1997). Dismissive critics hold that NSM leaders and core members are a 
"New Class" of bureaucratically entrenched, "politically correct," and powerful pseudo-left profes-
sionals (e.g., Piccone 1990-1991; Lasch 1995). On the break from Marxism, see Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantel Mouffe (1985); Ellen Meiksins Wood (1986); Anderson (1983;1998); andEagleton (1996). 
58. On the protests in Seattle, see Klee (1999); in Davos, see Kettmann (2000); and in 
Washington, see McKibben (2000). For left views on the protests and protesters, see St. Clair (2000) 
and Faux (2000); for a mainstream source, see Elliot (1999); for neoconservative and libertarian 
critiques, see Montgomery, Lindsey, and Morgen (1999); Will (1999); Huffington (1999); Zakaria 
(1999); and The Economist (1999a; 1999b; 1999c). For excellent coverage and diverse points of view 
on the antiglobalization protests, search Salon.com's archives on the topic (http://www.salon.com). 
59. As part of a growing concern about globalization, the UN Division for the Advancement of 
Women (2000) has recently suggested the need to address the gender dimensions of the growing 
inequalities that have accompanied globalization. 
60. In an afterword to the new edition of Cultural Contradictions to Capitalism, Daniel Bell 
(1996,285) stated that the postwar "social relation" between capital and labor "has been shrinking and 
the 'naked' economic relation has been assuming priority, especially in the rights of the 'shareholder' 
. . . as against the 'stakeholder. . . .'" 
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